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SARA GOSMAN* 
In 2014, as production soared in North Dakota’s oil fields, Energy 
Transfer Partners proposed a large pipeline to transport the oil to 
market. The very name of the project—Dakota Access—conveyed the 
company’s optimistic vision of a needed link between the prolific oil 
fields and the rest of the country. The vast scale of the pipeline project 
was matched only by the intensity of the opposition to the route. A bitter 
controversy erupted at Standing Rock over the risk of a catastrophic oil 
spill. Tribal members and environmentalists from across the nation 
united to protest the company’s decision to site the pipeline underneath 
a lake that serves as the sole source of drinking water for local tribes. 
The company defended the safety of its pipeline and ultimately 
prevailed. Dakota Access was completed in 2017. Since it began 
operation, it has leaked eight times. 
 
One would expect risk governance to take a more preventative 
approach to risk, as the potential for catastrophic harm increases and 
the ability to predict an accident decreases. But projects such as Dakota 
Access raise troubling questions about the current system governing the 
risks of energy pipelines. Why are pipelines being sited in 
environmentally sensitive and densely populated areas? To what extent 
does the system address the long-term risks of spills and releases? 
These questions are more important than ever before, as the domestic 
revolution in oil and gas production fundamentally reshapes pipeline 
networks and the geographic and political landscape of risk. 
 
This Article seeks answers by examining the laws governing energy 
pipelines through the lens of risk. The analysis reveals a critical flaw in 
risk governance: the risks associated with “siting” a pipeline are 
treated separately from the long-term “safety” of the pipeline. This 
formal legal distinction has a substantial practical effect on the risk 
landscape. By failing to consider the risks of an accident in the decision 
of where to locate a pipeline—that is, by failing to plan for failure—the 
system allows energy pipelines to be sited near people and sensitive 
ecosystems. This in turn leads to more accidents in vulnerable areas 
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and a greater risk burden on landowners and surrounding communities. 
The result is a system that sites first—and cleans up later.  
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“The Dakota Access Pipeline is built to be one of the safest, most 
technologically advanced pipelines in the world.”1 
 
“Just because oil is flowing today doesn’t mean it won’t leak in the 
future . . . . There’s an uneasy feeling that any moment, this pipeline could 
pose a threat to our way of life. It’s something you have to carry and be wary 
of all the time, and be ready for.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, Energy Transfer Partners announced it would construct a new 
pipeline, the Dakota Access pipeline, to transport crude oil from the Bakken 
shale play in North Dakota to markets in the Midwest and on the Gulf Coast.3 
The scale of the pipeline project reflected the bravado of the domestic revolution 
                                                                                                                     
 1 The Dakota Access Pipeline Is Safe, Efficient, and Environmentally Sound, DAKOTA 
ACCESS PIPELINE, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/Safety.html [https://perma.cc/6QVE-
7HFQ] (statement of Energy Transfer Partners).  
 2 Robinson Meyer, Oil Is Flowing Through the Dakota Access Pipeline, ATLANTIC 
(June 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/oil -is-flowing-
through-the-dakota-access-pipeline/529707/ [https://perma.cc/Z7QA-RV93] (statement 
of David Archambault II, the chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe). 
 3 Press Release, Energy Transfer Partners, Energy Transfer Announces Crude Oil 
Pipeline Project Connecting Bakken Supplies to Patoka, Illinois and to Gulf Coast Markets 
(June 25, 2014), https://ir.energytransfer.com/node/11911/pdf [https://perma.cc/92Z2-
SU4Z]. 
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in oil and gas production. The proposed pipeline was designed to transport up 
to 570,000 barrels of oil each day, approximately half of the daily production in 
the Bakken oil field.4 The planned route was over a thousand miles long and 
crossed fifty counties in four states.5 After receiving approval from each state, 
Energy Transfer Partners began to build the pipeline. But the company 
encountered significant resistance when it sought a federal easement to cross the 
Missouri River just above the Standing Rock reservation at Lake Oahe, the only 
source of drinking water for local tribes.6 The risk of an oil spill ignited a protest 
that would last months.7 Tribes and environmentalists challenged the 
company’s decision to site the pipeline in such a sensitive area and the legal 
framework that would allow a company to use such a route.8 After President 
Trump interceded and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted the 
easement, Energy Transfer Partners finally completed the project in 20179—at 
a cost of $7.5 billion, almost double the project estimate.10  
The opposition to the Dakota Access pipeline is part of a larger trend: 
communities are increasingly organizing to fight new energy pipelines. 
Residents of the densely populated Northeast,11 farmers in Iowa,12 and rural 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See Moving America’s Energy: The Dakota Access Pipeline, DAKOTA ACCESS 
PIPELINE, https://www.daplpipelinefacts.com/ [https://perma.cc/8XU6-2YKW]. 
 5 Id.; Alene Tchekmedyian & Melissa Etehad, 2 Years of Opposition, 1,172 Miles of 
Pipe, 1.3 Million Facebook Check-Ins. The Numbers to Know About the Standing Rock 
Protests, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-standing-rock-
numbers-20161101-story.html [https://perma.cc/X439-D8XV]. 
 6 Meyer, supra note 2. See generally Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota 
Access Pipeline Fight, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/ 
2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight [https://perma 
.cc/2XNT-5HJM] (providing an overview of the easement controversy). 
 7 Meyer, supra note 2. 
 8 Phil McKenna, Native American Pipeline Protest Halts Construction in N. Dakota, 
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 19, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18082016/ 
native-americans-sioux-tribe-protest-north-dakota-access-bakken-oil-pipeline-fossil-
fuels [https://perma.cc/RQV5-XP2F].  
 9 See Meyer, supra note 2. 
 10 CARLA F. FREDERICKS ET AL., FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, SOCIAL COST AND 
MATERIAL LOST: THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE 41 (Nov. 2018), https://www.colorado 
.edu/program/fpw/sites/default/files/attached-files/social_cost_and_material_loss_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TFV9-X96P]. 
 11 See Phil McKenna, Protesters Call for a Halt to Three Massachusetts Pipeline 
Projects, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 19, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/ 
19072016/natural-gas-pipeline-protests-boston-massachusetts-spectra-energy [https:// 
perma.cc/EYH9-ML9U]. 
 12 See Jen Fifield, As Pipeline Projects Grow, So Do Protests, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 
1, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/pipelines-proliferate-protests/ [https 
://perma.cc/UKZ4-9QR6]. 
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homeowners in Georgia,13 Virginia,14 Kentucky,15 and Pennsylvania16 have 
sought to halt the construction of pipelines. Facing such public opposition, 
companies have cancelled or delayed several pipelines.17 Protesters are painted 
as discontented, “not-in-my-backyard” property owners complaining about 
unwanted land uses,18 or as fringe environmentalists who want to keep oil and 
natural gas in the ground.19 But there is an alternative explanation: communities 
are increasingly concerned about the long-term risks of energy pipelines, 
including the impacts of spills and releases on the environment, human health, 
and public safety.20  
The concern is justified. The legal frameworks governing energy pipelines 
impose unnecessary risks on communities and the environment by dividing 
approval of pipeline “siting”21 from standards for pipeline “safety.”22 When 
government agencies review a proposed pipeline project, they primarily focus 
on the need for the pipeline and the negative effects of pipeline construction, 
                                                                                                                     
 13 See id. 
 14 See Jenna Portnoy, A Dilemma of Development vs. the Prospect of Losing Peace and 
Quiet, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
politics/a-dilemma-of-development-vs-the-prospect-of-losing-peace-and-quiet/2016/02/0 
6/dab301b8-c9b6-11e5-88ff-e2d1b4289c2f_story.html [https://perma.cc/XSM2-9DRB].  
 15 See James Bruggers, Kinder Morgan Cancels Fracked Liquids Pipeline Plan, and 
Pursues Another, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/18102018/natural-gas-pipeline-kinder-morgan-fracking-utica-marcellus [https:// 
perma.cc/V2WJ-FRYP]. 
 16 See Eliza Griswold, A Pipeline, a Protest, and the Battle for Pennsylvania’s Political 
Soul, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/a-pipeline-
a-protest-and-the-battle-for-pennsylvanias-political-soul [https://perma.cc/BW8G-DBY6]. 
 17 Zahra Hirji, It’s Not Just Dakota Access. Many Other Fossil Fuel Projects Delayed 
or Canceled, Too, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/06052016/fossil-fuel-projects-cancellations-keystone-xl-pipeline-oil-coal-natural 
-gas-climate-change-activists [https://perma.cc/8873-E9H5]; see also Ellen M. Gilmer 
et al., The East Coast’s Pipeline Wars: A Cheat Sheet, E&E NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060067235 [https://perma.cc/EDC7-3GRL].  
 18 See Fifield, supra note 12 (quoting Melissa Ruiz, spokeswoman for Kinder Morgan, 
as saying “[t]here are always going to be people who say not in my backyard”). 
 19 See Jordan Blum, Protests, Arrests Pick Up as Environmentalists Target Pipelines, 
HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/ 
Protests-arrests-pick-up-as-environmentalists-9983690.php [https://perma.cc/3XWV-
U4TZ] (stating that “environmentalists are targeting pipelines as the new public enemy 
number one” and “[w]ith the ‘keep it [in] the ground’ movement gaining support, the focus 
of efforts to slow the extraction of oil and gas has increasingly become pipelines”). 
 20 There are even longer-term risks of energy pipelines, notably the climate change 
enabled by fossil fuel infrastructure. Climate activists are increasingly focused on halting 
new pipelines to mitigate future greenhouse gas emissions. This Article considers the risks 
of spills and releases, leaving the issue of climate change risk to future work.  
 21 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2012) (requiring a federal certificate of public 
necessity and convenience for construction and extension of interstate natural gas pipelines).  
 22 49 U.S.C. § 60101; 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.1–.1015 (2019) (natural gas pipelines), 195.0–
.589 (hazardous liquid pipelines). 
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rather than on the risks of operation.23 Managing the risks of spills and releases 
to the surrounding area is left to the pipeline safety standards—which go into 
effect once the route is already established.24 Combined with a compelled 
transfer of property rights through eminent domain, the result is a governance 
system that defers largely to the pipeline company and its chosen route.  
The Standing Rock controversy is the exception that proves the rule. In 
addition to siting approval from each state, Energy Transfer Partners was 
required to obtain an easement from the USACE because the Dakota Access 
pipeline crossed a small area of a civil works project.25 Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the agency could not make a decision on the 
easement until it conducted an environmental assessment of the project to 
determine whether there were significant environmental impacts.26 Relying on 
federal safety standards, the USACE assessed the risk of an oil spill as low and 
concluded that a leak during pipeline operation was an “unlikely event.”27 This 
assessment would prove incorrect for the pipeline as a whole. From 2017 to 
2018, the Dakota Access pipeline has leaked eight times.28 The leaks were 
relatively small, however, and none have affected Lake Oahe.29  
The risk governance of oil and natural gas pipelines has never been more 
important. A revolution in domestic oil and gas production is occurring, as 
development companies extract the resources from shale and other “tight” rock 
                                                                                                                     
 23 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 24 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 25 See 33 U.S.C. § 408a (2012). The crossing also required an easement under the 
Mineral Leasing Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 185 (2012). 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). 
 27 JOHN W. HENDERSON, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: 
DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROJECT 88–94 (July 2016). Tribes and environmental 
organizations challenged the assessment, but the court deferred to the USACE and upheld 
the risk analysis. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 
F. Supp. 3d 101, 127 (D.D.C. 2017). The court remanded the assessment to the agency, 
however, to consider whether the project would be highly controversial in light of scientific 
critiques of the risk analysis and to analyze the effects of an oil spill on tribal hunting and 
fishing rights. Id. at 145–48. On remand, the USACE determined that the effects were not 
significant. JOHN L. HUDSON, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 
REMANDED BY THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RELATED TO THE 
DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE CROSSING AT LAKE OAHE 41 (Aug. 2018). As this Article went to 
press, the court has once again remanded the assessment to the agency because the 
“[u]nrebutted expert critiques regarding [the risk of oil spills] mean that the easement 
approval remains ‘highly controversial’” and the USACE must prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 
JEB, 2020 WL 1441923 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2020). 
 28 Distribution, Transmission & Gathering, LNG, and Liquid Accident and Incident 
Data, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/ 
data-and-statistics/pipeline/distribution-transmission-gathering-lng-and-liquid-accident-
and-incident-data [https://perma.cc/3H8B-N8GC] (follow “Hazardous Liquid Accident 
Data—January 2010 to present (ZIP)” hyperlink to download data and search for entries with 
DAPL-ETCO OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC and a DAPL pipeline segment). 
 29 Id. One affected a drinking water source area in Patoka, Illinois. 
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formations in plays across the country.30 The plays supply immense amounts of 
oil and gas, and production is growing.31 Because of this revolution, the United 
States became a net exporter of natural gas in 201732 and the largest producer 
of crude oil in the world in 2018.33 The rapid increase in oil and gas supply and 
changing demand are altering pipeline networks in profound ways. From 2004 
to 2017, the pipeline industry constructed over 125,000 miles of pipelines to 
transport oil and gas from production areas in the United States and the border 
of Canada to areas where the commodities will be used or exported.34 The 
industry expects to continue construction, with an additional 150,000 miles of 
new pipelines by 2035.35  
The growing scholarly literature on energy pipelines has focused on the 
siting frameworks that govern natural gas pipelines, oil pipelines, and other 
energy transportation infrastructure.36 Scholars have explored questions of 
                                                                                                                     
 30 MICHAEL RATNER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43148, AN 
OVERVIEW OF UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS: RESOURCES AND FEDERAL 
ACTIONS 1–7 (2015). 
 31 EIA Adds New Play Production Data to Shale Gas and Tight Oil Reports, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php? 
id=38372 [https://perma.cc/HR4H-NSEV]. 
 32 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2050, at 14 (Jan. 2019), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/aeo2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2A5S-RCCT] [hereinafter EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019]; see also IHS 
GLOBAL INC., OIL & NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION & STORAGE INFRASTRUCTURE: 
STATUS, TRENDS, & ECONOMIC BENEFITS 14 (Dec. 2013), https://www.api.org/~/media/ 
Files/Policy/SOAE-2014/API-Infrastructure-Investment-Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
62GH-XJC7]. 
 33 The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Producer, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053 
[https://perma.cc/SV6R-QHBJ]. 
 34 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 35 KEVEN PETAK ET AL., ICF, NORTH AMERICA MIDSTREAM INFRASTRUCTURE 
THROUGH 2035, at 88 (June 2018), https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34703 [https://  
perma.cc/EKW6-WPY6] [hereinafter ICF, NORTH AMERICA] (reporting a total estimate of 
149,128 miles of new pipelines by 2035 across the following three categories: 110,018 miles 
of new oil and gas gathering pipelines; 36,129 miles of oil, gas, and natural gas liquid 
pipelines; and 2,981 miles of oil product pipelines). Energy Transfer Partners has joined the 
fray again; it is proposing three new pump stations to increase the amount of oil the Dakota 
Access pipeline can transport. See Growth Opportunity, DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE, 
https://daplpipelinefacts.com/Updates.html [https://perma.cc/35BT-XRJN]. 
 36 See generally, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Future-Proofing Energy Transport Law, 94 
WASH. U. L. REV. 827 (2017) [hereinafter Klass, Future-Proofing] (considering how siting 
laws can encourage transportation infrastructure for clean energy); Alexandra B. Klass & 
Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA 
L. REV. 947 (2015) (assessing whether siting laws governing oil and gas pipeline networks 
are sufficient to facilitate new oil and gas pipelines); Tara K. Righetti, Siting Carbon Dioxide 
Pipelines, 3 OIL & GAS NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 907 (2017) (analyzing the current 
siting framework for carbon dioxide pipelines). 
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federalism,37 the use of eminent domain,38 the role of climate change,39 and the 
criteria governing the siting of transboundary pipelines.40 But the academy has 
paid less attention to the risks posed by pipeline accidents.41 This Article builds 
on the author’s previous work on pipeline safety and risk42 to consider how 
pipeline siting laws and safety laws address the long-term risk of pipeline 
accidents. It presents the first comprehensive analysis of siting laws through the 
lens of risk. As described in the Article, the siting framework is certainly 
fragmented. Jurisdiction is scattered among the federal government and the 
states, and various agencies apply different criteria to pipeline proposals. These 
differences are largely cosmetic, however, when viewed through the lens of 
long-term risk. The overarching legal framework produces a surprisingly 
uniform result: This is a framework that sites first—and cleans up later.  
The Article is divided into four parts. In Part II, I provide a detailed analysis 
of current data to describe the pipeline networks and explain the effect of the 
domestic energy revolution on those networks. In Part III, I explain the risks of 
energy pipelines and the ways in which the “safety” and “siting” legal 
frameworks address risk. This Part includes a fifty-state analysis of pipeline 
siting laws. In Part IV, I present a typology of risk policy approaches—a 
preventative approach, a management approach, and a remedial approach. 
While a preventative approach appears best suited to pipeline risk, I argue that 
the division between the siting and safety frameworks leads to less prevention. 
I contend that this creates several negative results, such as an increase in the 
                                                                                                                     
 37 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in 
Energy Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 458–63 (2017) (exploring federalism 
tensions in energy transportation infrastructure, including in the siting of interstate gas 
pipelines); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 217, 237–
38 (2012) (comparing state authority over siting of electricity generation facilities to federal 
control over the siting of other energy infrastructure, such as natural gas pipelines). 
 38 See, e.g., James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 
104 MINN. L. REV. 659, 680–92, 724–38 (2019) (describing the growing opposition to the 
use of eminent domain for oil and gas pipelines and assessing potential reforms to address 
public concern). 
 39 See generally, e.g., James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming 
Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119. 
 40 See, e.g., Sam Kalen, Thirst for Oil and the Keystone XL Pipeline, 46 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 1, 10–25 (2012) (examining the presidential permit criteria for the transboundary 
Keystone XL pipeline). 
 41 Cf. Klass, Future-Proofing, supra note 36, at 887–96 (arguing that energy law should 
encourage transportation of oil by rail rather than by pipeline, in part because of the greater 
potential for rail safety improvements); Righetti, supra note 36, at 925–27 (describing the 
safety framework governing carbon dioxide pipelines); see also David B. Spence, Regulation 
and the New Politics of (Energy) Market Entry, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327, 357–75, 378–
81 (2019) (presenting the results of an empirical study on nonprofit organizations that oppose 
energy infrastructure and arguing that opponents are misrepresenting the risk of projects).  
 42 See generally Sara Gosman, Justifying Safety: The Paradox of Rationality, 90 TEMP. 
L. REV. 155 (2018) (examining the legal framework governing pipeline safety and criticizing 
the federal law’s rationalist approach to risk). 
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number and catastrophic harm of pipeline incidents. Finally, I identify a policy 
solution that would combine the siting and safety frameworks into one risk 
governance system. 
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE ENERGY SYSTEM 
Today’s energy system depends on vast networks of underground pipelines 
that transport petroleum to users, in order to heat buildings, generate electricity, 
fuel cars, and manufacture thousands of products.43 Approximately three 
million miles of pipelines44 lie underneath cities and rural areas, coastal waters 
and inland streams, forests and grasslands, in almost every part of the United 
States.45 The pipelines transport 28 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,46 11.38 
billion barrels of crude oil,47 and 10.19 billion barrels of petroleum products48 
per year. No other transportation mode for commodities—including railways,49 
inland waterways,50 and paved roadways51—stretches as far to connect 
                                                                                                                     
 43 General Pipeline FAQs, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/faqs/general-pipeline-faqs [https://perma.cc/P4VK-L29M] (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2019); Products Made from Petroleum, RANKEN ENERGY CORP., https:// 
www.ranken-energy.com/index.php/products-made-from-petroleum/ [https://perma.cc/ 
53PX-LJZL] (including a partial list of 144 common products such as clothes, refrigerators, 
and eyeglasses). 
 44 PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44201, DOT’S FEDERAL PIPELINE 
SAFETY PROGRAM 1 (Mar. 2019). 
 45 Id. (describing pipelines as “geographically widespread, running alternately through 
remote and densely populated regions—from Arctic Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico and nearly 
everywhere in between”); Where Are Pipelines Located?, PIPELINE 101, https://pipeline 
101.org/Where-Are-Pipelines-Located [https://perma.cc/SF3Z-V57B].  
 46 Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https:// 
www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=natural_gas_pipelines [https://perma 
.cc/Q2HN-VZHQ] (last updated Dec. 5, 2019). 
 47 AM. PETROLEUM INST. & ASS’N OF OIL PIPE LINES, PIPELINE SAFETY EXCELLENCE 
PERFORMANCE: 2019 ANNUAL LIQUIDS REPORT 43 (2019), https://www.aopl.org/ 
documents/en-us/d904059a-c130-41f9-b8da-3ca7e100ad4a/1 [https://perma.cc/3JUG-
7QE8] (providing 2017 data). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See System Mileage within the United States, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, 
https://www.bts.gov/content/system-mileage-within-united-states [https://perma.cc/DU37-
8HYJ] (reporting 92,837 miles of Class 1 rail and 21,407 miles of Amtrak rail in 2018, and 
11,498 miles of transit rail in 2017). 
 50 See id. (reporting an estimated 25,000 miles of navigable channels, “which include 
rivers, bays, channels, and the inner route of the Southeast Alaskan Islands, but does not 
include the Great Lakes or deep ocean traffic”).  
 51 See Highway Statistics 2018: Public Road Length, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2018/hm12.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/3PBS-KVZZ] (last updated Oct. 29, 2019) (reporting 2,844,126 miles of 
paved public roads and streets in 2018). If unpaved roads are included, however, the length 
of the road transportation network exceeds that of energy pipelines. Id. (reporting 4,160,800 
miles of total roads and streets). 
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production and use. The sheer size of these pipeline networks is rivaled only by 
the transmission and distribution system for electricity.52 Unlike most electric 
wires, pipelines are hidden from public view until an operator constructs a new 
pipeline or an accident occurs, bringing the networks to the surface. A dramatic 
increase in domestic oil and natural gas production has spurred pipeline 
construction across the country—and reshaped the energy system.  
A. Energy Pipeline Networks 
There are two primary energy pipeline networks in the United States: a 
network that transports natural gas, and a network that transports liquid 
petroleum.53 In general, both networks carry domestically produced and 
imported fossil fuels to users and export facilities. But it is important to 
understand the specific features of the networks, both to appreciate the effects 
of the energy revolution and to evaluate the laws governing pipeline risk. 
The natural gas pipeline network consists of three interconnected types of 
systems: gathering systems, transmission systems, and distribution systems.54 
Operators of gathering pipeline systems collect raw natural gas from production 
fields.55 Depending on the constituents in the raw gas, the pipelines may carry 
the gas to a central processing facility or directly to the transmission pipeline 
system.56 Operators of transmission pipeline systems transport methane from 
gathering systems and import facilities to areas where the gas will be consumed 
or to terminals for export.57 Some large users—like power plants or 
manufacturing facilities—take delivery of the gas from transmission systems.58 
                                                                                                                     
 52 See W.M. WARWICK ET AL., PACIFIC NORTHWEST NAT’L LAB., ELECTRICITY 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BASELINE REPORT 11 tbl.2.2 (July 2016), https://www.energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Electricity%20Distribution%20System%20Baseline%20Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WBS-E3WL] (reporting 476,398 miles of electric transmission 
lines and 6,322,236 miles of distribution lines).  
 53 See How Do Pipelines Work?, PIPELINE 101, https://pipeline101.org/How-Do-
Pipelines-Work [https://perma.cc/3L4Y-N9UZ]. Liquid pipelines also transport liquefied 
gases, such as carbon dioxide, and liquefied hydrocarbons associated with natural gas 
production, such as ethane, propane, and butane. Id.  
 54 See THOMAS O. MIESNER & WILLIAM L. LEFFLER, OIL AND GAS PIPELINES IN 
NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 2 (2006). 
 55 In many cases, the gas extracted from the underground rock formation must be 
separated from water, solids, and crude oil. Id. at 89. The oil and heavier hydrocarbons, or 
lease condensate, are sent to a crude oil pipeline system. Id. The raw gas enters the gathering 
system at the separator outlet. Id. 
 56 Id. at 5. At a processing facility, methane is separated from impurities and other 
hydrocarbons. Id. 
 57 Id. at 6. The United States imports and exports natural gas by cross-border 
transmission pipelines and by tanker vessel. Id. at 92. To efficiently transport natural gas 
across the ocean, operators of export facilities must cool the gas until it liquefies. Id. Import 
terminals then re-gasify the methane before piping it to the transmission pipeline system. Id.  
 58 Id. at 6. 
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Transmission operators also deliver to local distribution companies, which 
transport the gas to customers through distribution pipelines.59  
There is very little information available on gas gathering systems because 
the vast majority are unregulated.60 An estimated 3500 private companies 
operate 356,000 to 400,000 miles of pipelines.61 In production areas where there 
are many wells and where operators have built processing and transmission 
infrastructure, the gathering systems are compact; short branch lines funnel gas 
from wells into larger pipelines that carry the gas to central facilities.62 In areas 
with fewer wells and less infrastructure development, the systems consist of 
longer pipelines that connect distant production fields.63 Traditionally, 
gathering systems are composed of small-diameter steel pipes that operate at 
low pressure.64 Operators utilize plastic and composite piping as cheaper 
alternatives to steel, but to what extent is unclear.65 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Id. at 99. 
 60 See PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY 
REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING—PIPELINE SAFETY: 
SAFETY OF GAS TRANSMISSION AND GATHERING PIPELINES 144 (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter 
PHMSA, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT] (estimating that PHMSA 
regulates 3% of onshore gathering pipelines and contending that data should be collected on 
all gathering systems); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-388, COLLECTING 
DATA AND SHARING INFORMATION ON FEDERALLY UNREGULATED GATHERING PIPELINES 
COULD HELP ENHANCE SAFETY 7 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter GAO, COLLECTING DATA AND 
SHARING INFORMATION]. 
 61 Compare PHMSA, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 60, 
at 144 (estimating 356,000 miles of gas gathering pipelines), with ICF INT’L, COST AND 
BENEFIT IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE PHMSA NATURAL GAS GATHERING AND TRANSMISSION 
SAFETY REGULATION PROPOSAL 11 (July 2016), https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Oil-
and-Natural-Gas/pipeline/2016-ICF/ICF-PHMSA-Proposed-Regulation-RIA-Analysis 
-070516.pdf [https://perma.cc/23GN-YBZ3] (estimating 399,579 miles of gas gathering 
pipelines).  
 62 See ACCUFACTS INC. & PIPELINE SAFETY TR., THE STATE OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES 
IN FORT WORTH 25 (Oct. 2010), https://pstrust.org/docs/FWFinal.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
J78Y-CVFA] (showing a map of gas gathering pipelines around Fort Worth, Texas).  
 63 See PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., ONSHORE GAS GATHERING 
FAQS 6–9 (July 2007), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/ 
about-phmsa/grants/pipeline/57056/gathering-faqs-7112007.pdf [https://perma.cc/47JJ 
-V9UD] (describing different configurations of gathering systems). 
 64 Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 
20,722, 20,724 (proposed Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191, 192); Natural 
Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, supra note 46. 
 65 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-639, PIPELINE SAFETY: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD IMPROVE FEDERAL USE OF DATA ON PIPELINE MATERIALS AND 
CORROSION 13–14, 16 (Aug. 2017) [hereinafter GAO, PIPELINE MATERIALS AND 
CORROSION]. 
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In contrast to localized gathering systems tied to production fields, gas 
transmission pipeline systems crisscross the nation.66 More than 210 systems 
form an integrated transmission grid of 300,000 miles of line pipe.67 The 
industry is very concentrated: just twenty-seven private companies operate 
almost two-thirds of these miles.68 Interstate “trunkline” systems, which 
transport gas over long distances between a few collection and distribution 
points, make up most of the grid.69 The rest of the systems generally operate 
within a major market and serve that region; unlike trunkline systems, the main 
pipelines have many interconnections and branch lines where gas can enter and 
exit the system.70 Because transmission systems transport large volumes of gas, 
the pipes are generally wide—trunklines can be greater than three feet in 
diameter71—and are constructed of steel that can withstand the high operating 
pressures.72 Mechanical devices compress gas from gathering systems to boost 
its pressure before the gas enters the transmission system, and compress gas 
once it is in the system to maintain pressure and counteract friction.73 There are 
more than 1400 compressor stations along the transmission grid.74 
Of the three types of natural gas pipeline systems, distribution systems are 
by far the most ubiquitous. Approximately 1400 local gas utilities distribute gas 
through 2.2 million miles of pipelines to 69.3 million customers in communities 
across the nation.75 The distribution systems begin at city gates, where operators 
                                                                                                                     
 66 See Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, supra note 46 (“The U.S. natural 
gas pipeline network is a highly integrated network that moves natural gas throughout the 
continental United States.”). 
 67 About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines—Transporting Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/archive/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/ind
ex.html [https://perma.cc/5EKP-EHTF] (based on 2007/2008 data with selected updates); 
Pipeline Mileage and Facilities, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-mileage-and-facilities 
[https://perma.cc/QX57-MJCE] (follow “2010+ Pipeline Miles and Facilities” hyperlink) 
(reporting 298,401.7 onshore miles and 3171.6 offshore miles of gas transmission pipelines 
in 2018).  
 68 See About, INTERSTATE NAT. GAS ASS’N OF AM., https://www.ingaa.org/about.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6SMH-DR4W] (“INGAA members operate almost 200,000 miles of 
pipeline.”). 
 69 Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Segment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www 
.eia.gov/naturalgas/archive/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/interstate.html  [https:// 
perma.cc/PKH4-XHC4]; Transportation Process and Flow, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/archive/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/pro
cess.html [https://perma.cc/Z7D3-ZDJJ]. 
 70 Transportation Process and Flow, supra note 69. 
 71 Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Segment, supra note 69; Natural Gas Pipeline 
Systems, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN, https://primis.phmsa.dot 
.gov/comm/NaturalGasPipelineSystems.htm [https://perma.cc/5HH8-7YQA]. 
 72 GAO, PIPELINE MATERIALS AND CORROSION, supra note 65, at 12–13.  
 73 See MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 5–6, 51, 105. 
 74 About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines—Transporting Natural Gas, supra note 67. 
 75 Pipeline Mileage and Facilities, supra note 67 (follow “2010+ Pipeline Miles and 
Facilities” hyperlink) (reporting 1372 operators, 1,307,826.6 miles of main pipelines, and 
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receive gas from transmission pipelines and add an odorant to give methane its 
distinctive smell.76 Gas is delivered to residences and businesses through main 
pipelines and small service lines that branch off the “mains.”77 These pipes—
particularly service lines—are generally smaller in diameter and operate at 
lower pressure.78 Beyond the basic function, the systems are remarkably 
heterogenous: they vary from small municipal systems of less than 1000 
customers to large investor-owned systems that service over 100,000 
customers.79 They also vary in materials. Systems may contain piping 
constructed of steel, plastic, cast iron, or copper.80 Most mains and service lines 
are now plastic because the material is flexible and resistant to corrosion.81  
The liquid petroleum pipeline network also consists of three types of 
systems: crude oil gathering systems, crude oil transmission systems, and 
product transmission systems.82 The gathering pipeline systems, like their 
counterparts in the natural gas network, connect production fields to the 
transmission systems that provide long-distance transport.83 But crude oil is 
processed at refineries that can be hundreds of miles away from production 
areas.84 The crude oil transmission systems transport raw crude from domestic 
gathering systems to refineries,85 while separate transmission systems carry 
                                                                                                                     
930,880 miles of service pipelines in 2018); Annual Report Mileage for Gas Distribution 
Systems, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot 
.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/annual-report-mileage-gas-distribution-systems [https:// 
perma.cc/G2WW-WEM3] (last updated Feb. 6, 2020) (reporting 69,349,129 services in 
2018). 
 76 See Fact Sheet: Distribution Pipelines, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMIN., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSDistributionPipelines.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KC8N-A9GX] (last updated Feb. 26, 2018). 
 77 Natural Gas Pipeline Systems, supra note 71. 
 78 See Fact Sheet: Distribution Pipelines, supra note 76. 
 79 OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., 
ASSURING THE INTEGRITY OF GAS DISTRIBUTION PIPELINE SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 
5–6 (May 2005), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/technical-
resources/pipeline/gas-distribution-integrity-management/61721/assuringintegrityofgas 
distributionpipelinesystemsreporttocongressmay2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DCM-4878]. 
 80 Pipeline Mileage and Facilities, supra note 67; Pipeline Replacement Background, 
PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/ 
pipeline_replacement/ [https://perma.cc/LS58-35FU] (last updated Sept. 20, 2019) 
(noting that although cast and wrought iron pipelines are some of the oldest pipeline 
materials in the United States, operators have made progress in replacing these high-risk 
pipelines).  
 81 See GAO, PIPELINE MATERIALS AND CORROSION, supra note 65, at 14–16. 
 82 See Petroleum Pipeline Systems, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMIN., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PetroleumPipelineSystems.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/V3X6-7SFX].  
 83 See MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 2–3. 
 84 CHERYL J. TRENCH & THOMAS O. MIESNER, THE ROLE OF ENERGY PIPELINES AND 
RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (May 2006), https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx? 
id=4857&v=7ac32bf8 [https://perma.cc/38R4-TQ3M]. 
 85 MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 3–4. 
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petroleum products and hydrocarbon gas liquids to direct users and distribution 
terminals.86 Both types of transmission systems also serve import and export 
markets.87 There are no distribution pipeline systems similar to the ones for 
natural gas; instead, trucks generally transport products to end users.88  
Like gas gathering systems, crude oil gathering systems operate largely 
without regulation and so data on the systems is sparse.89 There are an estimated 
30,000 to 40,000 miles of gathering pipelines;90 the number of operators is 
unknown. Gathering pipelines collect crude oil from storage tanks on well sites 
and carry it to oil terminals, where oil is aggregated in large tanks to await 
further transportation by transmission pipeline, rail, or truck.91 A system may 
also transport oil from several well sites to an interim central tank battery, before 
carrying the oil to an oil terminal.92 Depending on the location of the oil terminal 
and tank batteries, small pipelines may feed oil from production sites into main 
pipelines, or pipelines may connect one site to another in a more haphazard 
fashion.93 The pipes are traditionally smaller in diameter, constructed of steel, 
and operated at lower pressures.94  
Crude oil transmission pipeline systems connect domestic and foreign 
producers with U.S. refineries while also bringing domestically produced crude 
to the coast for export.95 Over 250 companies operate a loose grid of over 80,000 
miles of crude oil transmission pipelines, which extends across much of the 
nation.96 The systems share many features with gas transmission systems. The 
largest crude oil systems use long-distance trunklines with only a few receipt 
                                                                                                                     
 86 Id. at 4. 
 87 Id.; TRENCH & MIESNER, supra note 84, at 17–18.  
 88 How Do Pipelines Work?, supra note 53. 
 89 Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 61,610, 61,612 
(proposed Oct. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 195) (“Recent data indicates . . . that 
PHMSA regulates less than 4,000 miles of the approximately 30,000 to 40,000 miles of 
onshore hazardous liquid gathering lines in the United States.”). 
 90 GAO, COLLECTING DATA AND SHARING INFORMATION, supra note 60, at 3; TRENCH 
& MIESNER, supra note 84, at 13; Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 80 
Fed. Reg. at 61,612. 
 91 MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 3; ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. 
OF N.D., LIQUIDS GATHERING PIPELINES: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 11 (Dec. 2015), 
https://undeerc.org/bakken/pdfs/EERC%20Gathering%20Pipeline%20Study%20Fina
l%20Dec15.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ7G-5J6D]. The fluid mixture extracted through the 
production well is treated on site to separate crude oil from water, gases, and impurities. Id.  
 92 ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR., supra note 91, at 11. 
 93 See id. at 15–16 (showing maps of gathering systems). 
 94 Id. at 79, 122, 128. 
 95 See generally Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php 
[https://perma.cc/SDA3-YGUV] (last updated May 29, 2019) (explaining that the United 
States imports and exports crude oil). 
 96 Pipeline Mileage and Facilities, supra note 67 (follow “2010+ Pipeline Miles and 
Facilities” hyperlink) (reporting 80,748 miles of crude oil transmission pipelines and 267 
operators in 2018, not including those who operate only tanks). 
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and delivery points.97 The piping is constructed of steel,98 is wider in diameter, 
and is operated at higher pressures.99 Operators also use mechanical devices—
pumps—to increase the pressure of oil before it enters the transmission system 
and to ensure continued flow.100 But there is one significant difference between 
the two: while gas systems carry one commodity, crude oil transmission systems 
generally transport multiple grades of oil.101 Based on the demands of refineries, 
operators “batch” the grades by sequentially injecting the fluids into the 
transmission pipeline and removing the batches once they reach their 
destinations.102 
Other liquid transmission systems transport two categories of 
commodities—refined products and hydrocarbon gas liquids—for both the 
domestic and import-export markets. Refined product pipeline transmission 
systems deliver the petroleum products made from crude oil at refineries to large 
users and fuel terminals.103 These products include jet fuel, diesel fuel, gasoline, 
and heating oil.104 Liquefied gas transmission systems transport hydrocarbon 
gas liquids—the natural gas liquids separated from methane at natural gas 
processing plants and the liquefied gases produced by refineries—to 
manufacturers and distributors.105 The grids are similar in size: 188 companies 
operate approximately 62,000 miles of refined product pipelines, while 192 
companies operate approximately 70,000 miles of liquefied gas pipelines.106 
Like crude oil transmission systems, these liquid systems generally transport or 
                                                                                                                     
 97 See TRENCH & MIESNER, supra note 84, at 17–18. Shorter transmission pipelines 
transport crude oil to nearby refineries or receiving points for trunklines. Id. at 17. 
 98 Fact Sheet: Pipeline Materials, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMIN., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSPipelineMaterials.htm [https: 
//perma.cc/T6SR-SF8M] (last updated Oct. 9, 2015). Since 1970, operators of hazardous 
liquid pipelines—which include crude oil pipelines—have been required to notify PHMSA 
of any pipe constructed of materials other than steel. 49 C.F.R. § 195.8 (2019). 
 99 How Do Pipelines Work?, supra note 53 (stating that most crude oil transmission 
pipelines are 8 to 24 inches and a few are 48 inches in diameter). 
 100 See MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 3, 70, 247. 
 101 See TRENCH & MIESNER, supra note 84, at 12–15. 
 102 Id. at 15. 
 103 Petroleum Pipeline Systems, supra note 82; How Do Pipelines Work?, supra note 
53. 
 104 How Do Pipelines Work?, supra note 53. 
 105 See Hydrocarbon Liquids Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia 
.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=hgls_home [https://perma.cc/85TG-RQ2H] (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2019). For example, ethane is a natural gas liquid used as feedstock for 
plastics and chemicals, while propane is a liquefied petroleum gas used as fuel for heating 
and cooking. Id.  
 106 Pipeline Mileage and Facilities, supra note 67 (follow “2010+ Pipeline Miles and 
Facilities” hyperlink) (reporting 188 operators and 62,714.4 miles of refined products 
pipelines, and 192 operators and 70,268.6 miles of pipelines transporting “Highly Volatile 
Liquids (HVL), flammable, and toxic liquids,” which are generally liquefied hydrocarbon 
gases). 
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“batch” multiple commodities.107 But unlike the trunkline systems that carry oil 
over large distances, they are typically shorter in length and serve a region.108 
The steel piping is also smaller in diameter,109 though operated at high pressure.  
B. The Energy Revolution 
Over the last fifteen years, a revolution in oil and gas production has 
reshaped the energy system of the United States. Development companies have 
combined two techniques—high-volume hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
drilling—to extract large volumes of oil and natural gas from shale and other 
“tight” rock formations.110 These unconventional reservoirs underlie vast 
swaths of the country, including areas that have not traditionally produced oil 
and gas.111 The results are dramatic. From 2004 to 2018, the nation’s annual 
domestic gas production has increased by 64%, from 18.6 to 30.6 trillion cubic 
feet.112 In 2017, the United States produced so much natural gas that it became 
a net exporter, a feat that would have seemed impossible at the beginning of this 
century.113 Over the same period, annual domestic crude oil production rose 
from 2.0 to 4.0 billion barrels, an increase of 100%.114 In 2018, the nation 
became the top crude oil producer in the world and a net exporter of petroleum 
liquids—reclaiming energy independence for the first time in seventy-five 
years.115  
                                                                                                                     
 107 TRENCH & MIESNER, supra note 84, at 15. 
 108 Id. at 18–19. 
 109 Id. at 19. 
 110 RATNER & TIEMANN, supra note 30, at 1–7. In this type of development, a company 
drills vertically down to the target rock formation and then horizontally within the formation. 
GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL & ALL CONSULTING, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER ES-3 (Apr. 2009), https://www.energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/2013/03/f0/ShaleGasPrimer_Online_4-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8GY-
H3G8]. The horizontal leg can extend two or more miles, which increases the surface area 
in contact with the well. Id. To stimulate production, the company then hydraulically 
fractures the rock by injecting large volumes of fluid and sand into the well under high 
pressure. Id. at ES-4. The fractures allow the oil or gas to flow out of the formation and up 
to the surface. Id. Several of these wells can be drilled on one well site, the horizontal legs 
spreading out in different directions to efficiently drain the reservoir. Id. at ES-3, ES-5. 
 111 See IHS GLOBAL INC., supra note 32, at 15–16. 
 112 Open Data: U.S. Dry Natural Gas Production, Annual, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?sdid=NG.N9070US2.A [https://perma.cc/N5FZ 
-RJBG]. 
 113 IHS GLOBAL INC., supra note 32, at 14; EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019, supra 
note 32, at 14. 
 114 Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/ 
pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_m.htm [https://perma.cc/E68V-2EC2]. 
 115 See The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Producer, supra note 
33; Petroleum & Other Liquid: Weekly Imports and Exports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/supply/weekly/ [https://perma.cc/AL8Y-FXQH]. But see 
Robert Rapier, No, the U.S. Is Not a Net Exporter of Crude Oil, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2018), 
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As production increased, so did the need for transport. The nation’s energy 
pipeline networks were originally built to carry oil and gas from conventional 
production areas to nearby users.116 When the reservoirs began to empty and it 
seemed that the United States would be ever more dependent on oil and gas from 
other countries, energy companies responded by investing in new infrastructure 
that would bring imports to processing facilities and consumers.117 Starting in 
the late 1970s, companies built large crude oil transmission pipelines to 
transport imported oil from Gulf Coast ports to the north and expanded the 
Canadian oil pipeline system to bring oil from Alberta to the south.118 U.S. oil 
refineries invested in technologies to process these imported heavy crude oils.119 
Even at the beginning of this century, companies were constructing or restarting 
large import terminals on the East and Gulf coasts to accept liquefied natural 
gas by tanker vessel from countries as distant as Australia.120 The terminals 
were connected to interstate transmission pipelines to bring the gas to local 
distribution companies and large users.121  
But once the energy revolution began, pipeline companies that had pivoted 
away from domestic production towards imports suddenly faced new demands 
for transportation.122 Producers needed gathering pipelines to transport the oil 
and gas from thousands of wells in prolific shale plays to processing facilities 
and interstate transmission pipeline systems.123 This need was particularly acute 
in nontraditional production areas—such as the Marcellus and Utica shale gas 
plays in the Appalachian region—which contained little to no existing pipeline 
infrastructure.124 The gathering pipeline industry struggled to keep up with the 
number of wells drilled in these regions, frustrating development companies and 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/12/09/no-the-u-s-is-not-a-net-exporter-of-crude-
oil/ [https://perma.cc/6WX2-2HML] (concluding that the nation still consumes more crude 
oil than it produces). 
 116 See MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 9–15 (chronicling the early history of oil 
and gas pipelining).  
 117 See IHS GLOBAL INC., supra note 32, at 12.  
 118 See id. at 13; JOHN F. KIEFNER & CHERYL J. TRENCH, OIL PIPELINE CHARACTERISTICS 
AND RISK FACTORS: ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE DECADE OF CONSTRUCTION 25 (Dec. 2001), 
https://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/ppts/other-
files/decadefinal.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/Q7WH-XRJM] . 
 119 ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41478, THE U.S. OIL 
REFINING INDUSTRY: BACKGROUND IN CHANGING MARKETS AND FUEL POLICIES 16 (2010). 
 120 IHS GLOBAL INC., supra note 32, at 14. 
 121 See id. See generally MIESNER & LEFFLER, supra note 54, at 5–6 (describing natural 
gas pipeline value chain). 
 122 See IHS GLOBAL INC., supra note 32, at 15–19 (discussing the U.S. shale oil and gas 
revolution and the corresponding increase of capital investment in pipeline infrastructure). 
 123 See id. 
 124 See Spot Natural Gas Prices at Marcellus Trading Point Reflect Pipeline 
Constraints, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 23, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayin 
energy/detail.php?id=7210 [https://perma.cc/XZ64-BFK2].  
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slowing production.125 Yet even plays in more traditional production areas, such 
as the Bakken shale play in North Dakota, required significant expansions in 
gathering systems: one to transport the produced oil to oil terminals,126 and 
another to transport the gas that flowed to the surface with the oil to the rest of 
the gas pipeline network.127 By one estimate, approximately 28,000 miles of gas 
gathering pipelines and 20,000 miles of oil gathering pipelines were built 
between 2013 and 2017 alone.128  
Meanwhile, producers needed transmission pipelines to transport oil, gas, 
and hydrocarbon liquids from shale play regions to shifting markets. When 
production increased and prices dropped, domestic demand rose as well. The 
electric power sector turned more and more towards natural gas to generate 
electricity, encouraged by federal and state environmental policies and the 
retirement of aging coal-fired power plants.129 Residential, commercial, and 
industrial users consumed more natural gas—and distribution systems grew.130 
Demand for hydrocarbon liquids—notably chemical feedstocks—increased.131 
Producers also responded to declining prices by seeking to export oil and gas to 
markets abroad.132 Owners of liquefied natural gas import terminals proposed 
export facilities.133 Because domestic oil refineries had invested in processing 
equipment for imported heavy crude oil before the energy revolution, they had 
limited capacity to refine the light crude oil extracted from shale plays.134 After 
intense lobbying by producers, Congress cemented the shift in energy transport 
                                                                                                                     
 125 See id. (stating that, at the time, over 1000 wells in northern Pennsylvania had been 
drilled but were unable to produce because of a lack of pipeline infrastructure).  
 126 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42032, THE BAKKEN FORMATION: LEADING 
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL DEVELOPMENT 6 (2012).  
 127 See Over One-Third of Natural Gas Produced in North Dakota Is Flared or 
Otherwise Not Marketed, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www 
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4030 [https://perma.cc/F7ZH-9ZBM]. 
 128 ICF, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 35, at 88. 
 129 See id. at 3; see also Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/data.php [https://perma.cc/GGK8-AYTX] (select 
“Consumption,” then “Total consumption”) (reporting that U.S. natural gas deliveries to the 
electric power sector roughly doubled between 2004 and 2018). 
 130 See Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, supra note 129; see also Both Natural 
Gas Supply and Demand Have Increased from Year-Ago Levels, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37193 [https://perma 
.cc/22MU-ABQH]. 
 131 Petroleum & Other Liquids, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/ 
petroleum/data.php [https://perma.cc/J8WM-HD3Z] (select “Consumption/sales,” then 
“Product supplied”) (showing increases in consumption of ethane, a chemical feedstock, 
since 2010). 
 132 See MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42074, U.S. NATURAL GAS 
EXPORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 3 (2015); PHILLIP BROWN ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43442, U.S. CRUDE OIL EXPORT POLICY: BACKGROUND AND 
CONSIDERATIONS 10–12 (2014). 
 133 RATNER ET AL., supra note 132, at 3. 
 134 BROWN ET AL., supra note 132, at 5, 20; IHS GLOBAL INC., supra note 32, at 30. 
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from imports to exports in 2015 by lifting the ban on exports of crude oil that 
had been enacted forty years earlier in the wake of the Arab oil embargo.135  
Transmission pipeline companies responded to these significant changes in 
supply and demand in three ways. First, they sought to expand the footprint of 
transmission systems to connect new delivery and receipt points and to increase 
transportation capacity.136 Some projects were designed to lengthen existing 
pipeline systems,137 and others to construct new interstate pipelines.138 Second, 
they sought to transport the large volumes of oil and gas produced in shale plays 
by increasing the capacity of existing routes.139 Projects ranged from adding 
compression or pump stations to boost operating pressures,140 to constructing 
new pipelines parallel to older pipelines,141 to replacing older pipelines with 
new, higher capacity pipelines.142 Third, they sought to alter the purpose of 
existing transmission systems so the systems could carry products in the right 
                                                                                                                     
 135 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 101(a), 129 Stat. 
2242, 2987 (2015) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6212(a)); Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, 871, 877–78 (1975). 
 136 See New Infrastructure Aims to Increase Takeaway Capacity of Natural Gas from 
Utica Region, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/today 
inenergy/detail.php?id=28872 [https://perma.cc/5LWK-MPBA]. 
 137 See id. (describing two projects, the Leach Xpress and Rayne Xpress, to expand the 
Columbia Pipeline natural gas transmission system). 
 138 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 132, at 17–18; see also id. at 17 n.80 (noting 
Enbridge’s proposed Sandpiper project, a new crude oil pipeline, which was not built after 
public opposition). 
 139 See Christopher M. Matthews & Lynn Cook, Pipeline Builders Try New Growth 
Strategy: Bigger Pipes, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pipeline-
builders-outflank-opposition-with-expansions-1516185001 [https://perma.cc/9SNU-
KFHY]. 
 140 See Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 20,722, 20,726–27 (proposed Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191, 192); 
Broad Run Expansion Project, KINDER MORGAN, https://www.kindermorgan.com/pages/ 
business/gas_pipelines/east/broadrun/ [https://perma.cc/F532-HG7F] (describing project 
to add compression to existing natural gas transmission pipeline). 
 141 See Overview, ENERGY TRANSFER, https://marinerpipelinefacts.com/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/V4R5-KRKA] (describing project to build two hydrocarbon liquids 
pipelines, primarily along the route of an existing pipeline). 
 142 See, e.g., Line 3 Replacement Project, ENBRIDGE, https://www.enbridge.com/ 
projects-and-infrastructure/public-awareness/minnesota-projects/line-3-replacement-
project [https://perma.cc/82YK-SHT2] (describing project to replace existing oil pipeline 
with a larger pipeline). 
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direction.143 These projects included reversing the flow of commodities144 and 
converting pipelines to transport new products.145  
The result is a pipeline transportation system that is remaking itself, one 
project at a time. Oil and hydrocarbon liquids transmission companies have 
steadily expanded the systems’ footprint by building new, large pipelines that 
carry the commodities to export terminals or to be refined or processed. From 
2004 to 2018, the total length of oil systems increased by almost 30,000 miles 
or 64%.146 One of these pipelines was the Dakota Access pipeline.147 
Hydrocarbon liquids systems grew by approximately 18,000 miles or 36% 
during the same time period.148 Natural gas transmission systems added 
approximately 34,000 miles of new pipeline during this time, but the size of the 
gas transmission footprint declined slightly because the industry 
decommissioned older pipelines.149 In the last few years, the pace of new gas 
transmission pipeline construction has skyrocketed.150 In 2017 alone, 
                                                                                                                     
 143 See Mike Kirkwood, Pipeline Reversals and Conversions: Case Studies and Best 
Practices, 242 PIPELINE & GAS J. 26, 26 (2015) (discussing the increase in pipeline flow-
reversals caused by the boom in U.S. shale plays). 
 144 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 132, at 17 n.79 (noting the Seaway oil pipeline reversal 
project, which was completed in 2012). 
 145 See, e.g., Enbridge and Energy Transfer Join to Provide Crude Oil Pipeline Access 
to Eastern Gulf Coast Market, ENBRIDGE (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.enbridge.com/ 
media-center/news/details?lang=en&year=2013&id=1687747 [https://perma.cc/S6YS 
-ZKSN] (describing project to convert a natural gas transmission pipeline to a crude oil 
pipeline). 
 146 Annual Report Mileage for Hazardous Liquid or Carbon Dioxide Systems, PIPELINE 
& HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-
statistics/pipeline/annual-report-mileage-hazardous-liquid-or-carbon-dioxide-systems 
[https://perma.cc/9LR8-HL3Z] (last updated Feb. 6, 2020) (showing that annual reported 
mileage grew from 49,264 to 80,719 miles for crude oil systems). 
 147 Addressing Misconceptions About the Dakota Access Pipeline, DAKOTA ACCESS 
PIPELINE, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/The-Facts.html [https://perma.cc/QNY8-TLHL]. 
 148 Annual Report Mileage for Hazardous Liquid or Carbon Dioxide Systems, supra note 
146 (showing that annual reported mileage grew from 51,794 to 70,267 miles for highly 
volatile liquid systems). 
 149 See Gas Distribution, Gas Gathering, Gas Transmission, Hazardous Liquids, 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and Underground Natural Gas Storage (UNGS) Annual 
Report Data, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa 
.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/gas-distribution-gas-gathering-gas-transmission-
hazardous-liquids [https://perma.cc/K4AA-JRG7] (last updated Mar. 9, 2020) (follow “Gas 
Transmission & Gathering Annual Data” hyperlinks to download data for 2004 and 2018); 
Annual Report Mileage for Natural Gas Transmission & Gathering Systems, PIPELINE & 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/ 
pipeline/annual-report-mileage-natural-gas-transmission-gathering-systems [https:// 
perma.cc/ZP77-7BHY] (last updated Feb. 6, 2020) (showing that annual reported mileage 
of gas transmission pipelines fell from 303,001 miles to 301,578 miles). 
 150 See Northeast Region Slated for Record Natural Gas Pipeline Capacity Buildout in 
2018, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 18, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayin 
energy/detail.php?id=36272 [https://perma.cc/DN7T-59K8]. 
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companies built 773 miles of new pipeline, most of which were designed to 
carry natural gas from the Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Midwest.151 
That same year, the federal government approved forty-nine more projects to 
construct 2739 miles of pipeline.152 The projects included largest-capacity gas 
pipeline ever approved: the 713-mile Rover pipeline, which transports gas from 
the Marcellus and Utica plays to Michigan and to market hubs in Canada.153 
All predictions are that the domestic energy revolution is not over. Vast 
potential drilling areas and improving technology will likely spur more 
development.154 Annual natural gas production is expected to rise from 29.5 
trillion cubic feet in 2018 to 43.4 trillion cubic feet in 2050, driven by production 
from the Marcellus and Utica shale plays in the northeast and the Eagle Ford 
and Haynesville shale plays in the Gulf Coast region.155 Development of 
unconventional resources is also expected to drive an increase in annual oil 
production, from 4.0 billion barrels in 2018 to a peak of 5.3 billion barrels in 
2031, before production falls to 4.3 billion barrels in 2050.156 Production in the 
Permian Basin play in west Texas and eastern New Mexico is predicted to 
rapidly rise, while the Bakken shale play and plays in the Gulf Coast region will 
contribute smaller amounts.157  
In this energy future, the pipeline industry will reshape itself even more to 
carry oil, gas, and petroleum products to consumers and export markets. From 
2018 to 2035, the industry expects to invest $266 to $336 billion and build 
approximately 150,000 miles of new pipelines in the United States.158 This 
predicted buildout would be greater than the one that has already taken place.  
The majority of the pipeline construction is expected to occur in the natural 
gas pipeline network.159 The industry predicts that gathering pipeline companies 
will add 73,500 miles of new gas gathering pipelines to the current network 
                                                                                                                     
 151 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 2017 STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT 4 (Apr. 
2018), https://www.ferc.gov/market-assessments/reports-analyses/st-mkt-ovr/2017-som-A-
3-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL5W-MTVF]. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id.; Rover Pipeline LLC, 158 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2017); Rover Pipeline Project, ROVER 
PIPELINE, https://www.roverpipelinefacts.com/ [https://perma.cc/FU7N-FAFJ]. 
 154 EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019, supra note 32, at 76 (stating that there are 
roughly 500,000 square miles of oil and gas resources in the United States). 
 155 Id. at 78; Annual Energy Outlook 2019: Oil and Gas Supply, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=14-AEO2019&cases= 
ref2019&sourcekey=0 [https://perma.cc/75MC-DGM7].  
 156 Annual Energy Outlook 2019: Oil and Gas Supply, supra note 155. 
 157 EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019, supra note 32, at 57–58. 
 158 ICF, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 35, at 88, 146, 151, 153–54, 158, 160–61 
(predicting capital investment of $220.3–$280.2 billion for U.S. natural gas pipeline systems, 
$13.8–$15.6 billion for U.S. natural gas liquid pipeline systems, $4.7–$6.5 billion for U.S. 
crude oil gathering pipeline systems, and $27.2–$33.2 billion for U.S. crude oil transmission 
pipeline systems). 
 159 See id. at 80, 88. 
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between 2018 and 2035—an increase of 20%.160 About half of this new 
construction is expected to occur in Gulf Coast plays, in conjunction with a rapid 
rise in production.161 During the same period, the industry predicts that the 
transmission grid will transport an additional 50 billion cubic feet per day of 
natural gas, half of which will be from the Marcellus and Utica shale plays.162 
To carry this amount of gas, transmission companies will build 24,000 miles of 
new pipeline, an increase of 8%.163 There are different predictions as to where 
the pipelines will be constructed. The industry expects to build pipelines in the 
Northeast, South, and Gulf Coast regions, where the added capacity will 
primarily serve gas-fired power plants and export facilities.164 The federal 
government also predicts that the natural gas transmission grid will expand to 
transport increasing supplies from the Marcellus and Utica shale plays.165 But 
it expects that the buildout will occur in the Midwest, which will serve as a 
throughway for gas from the shale plays to the South and Gulf Coast.166 
The oil and hydrocarbon liquids pipeline network is expected to grow less 
overall because the industry has already invested in several large pipelines.167 
But the Permian Basin is experiencing dramatic growth and will need many 
more gathering pipelines.168 The industry predicts that gathering pipeline 
systems will double between 2018 and 2035, as 36,000 miles of new pipelines 
are built in the Permian Basin and Gulf Coast plays.169 Oil transmission pipeline 
systems will expand by 6400 miles, or 8% of the current grid, during the same 
time period.170 These new pipelines will transport an additional 2.1 billion 
barrels of oil, primarily from the Permian Basin to refineries along the Gulf 
Coast.171 Pipeline capacity is also needed to transport imports of Canadian 
heavy crude oil and domestic oil from the Bakken shale through a central 
corridor to U.S. refineries.172 Construction on most of these projects is expected 
to occur between 2023 and 2028.173 Finally, the industry predicts that 8600 
miles of hydrocarbon liquids pipeline will be built, primarily to transport liquids 
from production areas to manufacturers and the coast for export.174  
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III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING RISK 
Energy pipelines pose risks to the environment, health, and public safety.175 
When a pipeline system releases gases or liquids, it can damage natural 
resources, harm human health, and injure or kill members of the public. 
Regulation of these risks is divided between decisions about the “safety” of a 
pipeline and decisions about the “siting” of a pipeline. The safety framework 
focuses on preventing and managing accidents from the sited pipeline. The 
framework is concentrated in federal law and consists of minimum standards 
for most types of pipelines. In contrast, the siting framework focuses on whether 
the pipeline should be built, the location of the pipeline, and the acquisition of 
property rights. The framework is fragmented by type of pipeline and decision-
maker, resulting in a patchwork of policy approaches. The two frameworks are 
formally separate, leaving the relationship between the location of a pipeline 
and the long-term risk of a spill or release unaddressed.  
A. The Risk of Energy Pipelines 
The risk posed by energy pipelines is a function of two elements: (1) the 
probability—or likelihood—of a failure of the integrity of a pipeline system, 
and (2) the magnitude of the consequences of a release or spill of product to 
public safety, human health, and the environment.176 Energy pipelines pose a 
low-frequency, high-consequence risk. Accidents are relatively infrequent 
given how vast the networks are. Each year, energy pipelines cause an average 
of 295 significant accidents.177 Onshore accidents are distributed roughly 
evenly among the pipeline systems; the annual average ranges from sixty-eight 
accidents on gas transmission pipelines to eighty-four accidents on hydrocarbon 
                                                                                                                     
 175 “Risk” is defined in different ways. At its most general, risk “refers to uncertainty 
about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect 
to something that humans value.” Terje Aven & Ortwin Renn, On Risk Defined as an Event 
Where the Outcome Is Uncertain, 12 J. RISK RES. 1, 6 (2009). 
 176 PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., PIPELINE RISK MODELING: 
OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND TOOLS FOR IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION 17–18 (May 2018), 
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/rmwg/docs/Pipeline_Risk_Modeling_Technical_Information
_Document_05-09-2018_Draft_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MLH-2DW8] [hereinafter PHMSA, 
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 177 National Pipeline Performance Measures, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/national-pipeline-
performance-measures [https://perma.cc/2BF8-EE66] (follow “Significant Incidents” 
hyperlink) (reporting the annual average over the past ten years) (last updated Mar. 4, 2020). 
A significant incident is an accident that causes a “[f]atality or injury requiring in-patient 
hospitalization[;] $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984 dollars[;] [h]ighly volatile 
liquid releases of 5 barrels or more or other liquid releases of 50 barrels or more; [or] [l]iquid 
releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion.” Id. 
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liquid transmission pipelines.178 By mile of pipeline, gas distribution pipelines 
are by far the safest.179 Energy pipeline accidents cause twelve deaths, seriously 
injure sixty-three people, and result in $671.6 million of property damage on 
average per year.180 But when a pipeline accident happens, catastrophic 
consequences are more likely to occur than would be predicted by a normal 
distribution of harm.181 In 2010, for example, a PG&E gas transmission pipeline 
exploded in a residential neighborhood of San Bruno, California, killing eight 
people, injuring fifty-eight, and causing $558 million in property damage.182 
That same year, an oil transmission pipeline operated by Enbridge spilled over 
one million gallons of heavy crude oil into a creek near Marshall, Michigan.183 
The oil flowed almost forty miles down the Kalamazoo River, causing more 
than $840 million in damage; cleanup took over four years.184  
There are many threats that could cause a pipeline to fail, including defects 
in the manufacturing of system components, incorrect construction or 
installation of the system, degradation of materials over time, mistakes in 
operation, or external human or natural forces.185 Over the last twenty years, the 
leading cause of accidents in the few regulated natural gas gathering pipelines 
                                                                                                                     
 178 Id. (on average over the last ten years, onshore hydrocarbon liquids pipelines caused 
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National Pipeline Performance Measures, supra note 177. 
 183 EPA Response to Enbridge Spill in Michigan, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/enbridge-spill-michigan [https://perma.cc/DGZ2-472G] (last updated 
Dec. 12, 2018).  
 184 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/PAR-12/01, PIPELINE ACCIDENT REPORT: 
ENBRIDGE INCORPORATED HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE RUPTURE AND RELEASE, 
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN 57 (July 2012), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Accident 
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TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ENBRIDGE REPORT]; Enbridge Spill Response Timeline, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enbridge-spill-michigan/enbridge-spill-
response-timeline [https://perma.cc/K7SJ-KB3S] (last updated Mar. 19, 2019); National 
Pipeline Performance Measures, supra note 177 (reporting a total cost of $840,526,118). 
 185 PHMSA, PIPELINE RISK MODELING, supra note 176, at 32–33. 
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is internal corrosion of the metal piping.186 These pipelines carry raw gas, which 
is more likely to contain contaminants that react with metal.187 In contrast, the 
primary cause of accidents in natural gas and liquid transmission pipelines is a 
failure in the physical components of the pipeline system—flaws in the 
construction or installation of a pipeline, cracks in the pipe, or malfunction of 
control equipment.188 These failures can occur in any pipeline system, but they 
are more likely to lead to accidents in transmission pipelines because the 
systems are complex and transport large volumes of commodities at high 
pressures. Finally, the leading cause of accidents in gas distribution pipelines is 
excavation damage, usually by third parties engaged in construction 
activities.189 This is because gas distribution pipelines run underneath streets 
and commercial and residential property in developed areas.190 
The consequences of an accident depend on the commodity the pipeline is 
carrying, the volume of the product released, the rate at which the product 
disperses, and the people and environment in the affected area.191 Natural gas 
and some hydrocarbon liquids are flammable, so a rupture in a pipeline 
transporting one of these substances can result in an immediate explosion and 
fire, killing or injuring people and destroying property.192 If the hydrocarbon 
liquids are volatile but dense, the heavy gas can move along the surface of the 
ground and suffocate people before exploding.193 A liquid spill—whether of 
crude oil or other hydrocarbon liquids that remain liquefied—can flow over the 
ground, polluting surface waters, harming natural resources, and damaging 
property.194 Depending on the permeability of the soil, the spill can seep through 
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 192 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE 1–
2 (2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=804318 [https://perma.cc/JR5T-HTHQ]. 
 193 Id. at 2. 
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the ground and contaminate groundwater.195 Exposure to compounds in crude 
oil can also harm human health.196  
Just as the domestic energy revolution has fundamentally changed oil and 
gas pipeline networks, so has it changed the landscape of risk. Each time a new 
pipeline is installed, more communities and natural resources are put at risk. In 
a commonly recognized phenomenon known as the “bathtub curve,” newer 
pipelines generally experience a higher accident rate than older pipelines 
because material and construction defects are likely to surface when pipelines 
first begin operation.197 But the risk profile of the pipelines themselves is also 
changing. To accommodate the increased flow of oil, gas, and hydrocarbon 
liquids, companies are building pipelines with wider diameters and operating 
them at higher pressures. Some natural gas gathering pipelines in shale plays are 
so large that they function similarly to gas transmission lines.198 In the future, 
the industry expects to build larger gathering and transmission pipelines than it 
is building today—across every type of system.199 The size of transmission 
pipelines, which are already wider than other types of pipelines, will increase 
the most.200 
B. The Safety Framework 
The federal Pipeline Safety Act is the primary legal framework governing 
the risk of accidents from gathering, transmission, and distribution energy 
pipelines.201 The Act grants the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) broad authority to prescribe minimum safety 
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standards for the transportation of gases and hazardous liquids by pipeline.202 
These standards, which are adopted by rule, must be “practicable” and 
“designed to meet the need for . . . pipeline safety . . . and protecting the 
environment.”203 But the statute’s concept of “safety” is limited to the pipeline 
system: the design, installation, and construction of the new pipeline; the 
operation and maintenance of the pipeline once it is in the ground; the plans and 
procedures for a pipeline emergency; and the eventual replacement or 
abandonment of the pipeline.204  
The Act draws a bright line between “safety” and “siting” by specifically 
providing that it “does not authorize [PHMSA] to prescribe the location or 
routing of a pipeline facility.”205 The standards contain only one modest 
restriction on siting—an admonition that a right-of-way for a hazardous liquid 
pipeline “must be selected to avoid, as far as practicable, areas containing 
private dwellings, industrial buildings, and places of public assembly.”206 In 
recognition that this restriction will not prevent operators from continuing to 
locate pipelines near buildings, the standard also provides that the operator must 
bury the liquid pipeline more deeply if it is located within fifty feet of a private 
dwelling or an industrial building or place of public assembly “in which persons 
work, congregate, or assemble.”207  
As the domestic energy revolution has radically reshaped the pipeline 
networks during the last fifteen years, the approach to risk has remained the 
same: to “keep the product in the pipe.” Rather than limit where pipelines can 
be sited, the safety framework focuses on protecting the area around the pipeline 
after the fact. PHMSA does not approve new pipeline projects or expansions in 
a pipeline system.208 Instead, the materials, design, and construction of a new 
pipeline and its components are governed by technical engineering standards.209 
The standards include specific prescriptive requirements, such as a design 
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petroleum products, such as crude oil and hydrocarbon liquids, as well as “nonpetroleum 
fuel” and liquid substances that “may pose an unreasonable risk to life or property” when 
transported in pipelines. Id. § 60101(a)(4). While the safety standards for gas and hazardous 
liquid pipelines are separate, they have many similarities. 
 203 Id. § 60102(b)(1). 
 204 Id. § 60102(a)(2)(B). 
 205 Id. § 60104(e). 
 206 49 C.F.R. § 195.210(a) (2019). 
 207 Id. § 195.210(b). 
 208 The operator may apply for a special permit if it would like an exception or 
modification to the rules. 49 U.S.C. § 60118(c) (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 190.341 (2019). In 2017, 
PHMSA responded to the energy revolution by requiring companies to notify it of pipeline 
construction projects or other operational changes such as a change in product or reversal of 
the flow of a product. Pipeline Safety: Operator Qualification, Cost Recovery, Accident and 
Incident Notification, and Other Pipeline Safety Changes, 82 Fed. Reg. 7972, 7973 (Jan. 23, 
2017) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 190–92, 195, 199). 
 209 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.51–.329, 195.100–.264 (2019). 
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formula for steel pipe that determines the maximum safe operating pressure.210 
They also include general standards of performance—such as requiring the pipe 
to be sufficiently thick to withstand the internal and external pressures on the 
pipeline system.211  
Once the pipeline is in the ground, PHMSA is prohibited from applying 
design, installation, and construction standards to existing pipelines—thus 
ensuring that a company need not reconstruct pipelines in the ground to current 
standards.212 The operation and maintenance of the pipeline is primarily 
governed by management directives.213 The standards require operators to 
create and follow a written manual of procedures for each task,214 as well as to 
develop programs to address particular issues, such as training of employees and 
monitoring of pipelines in control centers.215 To address the risk of third-party 
excavation damage, the standards require pipeline operators to mark the location 
of their pipelines as part of “call-before-you-dig” programs.216 If the technical 
and management standards fail to keep the product in the pipe, the safety 
framework relies on operators’ emergency response planning to mitigate the 
damage. Operators must have emergency procedures that include a “[p]rompt 
and effective response” to notice of the accident and the necessary actions to 
minimize the spill or release and public exposure to injury.217  
The safety framework responds to the risks associated with siting a pipeline 
in a certain location by focusing more attention on “high-consequence” areas. 
These areas are limited to ones where an accident could cause catastrophic harm. 
For gas pipelines, the standards focus on densely settled areas near the pipeline, 
where an explosion would cause the most fatalities and injuries.218 The 
definition is so narrow that it only captures 6.9% of the gas transmission pipeline 
grid.219 For hazardous liquid pipelines, the standards focus on municipal census 
tracts, commercially navigable waterways, and “unusually sensitive areas”—
drinking water sources and certain habitats of imperiled, threatened, or 
                                                                                                                     
 210 Id. §§ 192.105, .619, 195.106, .406. 
 211 Id. §§ 192.103, 195.112(a). 
 212 49 U.S.C. § 60104(b) (2012). 
 213 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.605, .614–.16, .631, 195.402, .440–.46. 
 214 Id. §§ 192.605, .615, 195.402–.403. 
 215 Id. §§ 192.801–.809, 195.501–.509. 
 216 Id. §§ 192.614, 195.442. 
 217 Id. §§ 192.605(a), (e), .615, 195.402(a), (e). 
 218 Id. § 192.903 (defining “high-consequence area[s]” to include areas near the pipeline 
where multi-story buildings are prevalent or there are forty-six or more buildings; or where 
the potential impact circle contains twenty or more buildings or a regularly occupied 
structure such as a playground, church, or hospital). The standards use different terms for 
protected areas: class locations and high-consequence areas. See id. §§ 192.5, .903. The 
approach to risk, however, is the same. 
 219 GT IM Performance Measures, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/gas-transmission-integrity-management/gt-
im-performance-measures [https://perma.cc/E4BM-DPM2] (last updated Feb. 6, 2020) 
(follow “GT IM Assessment” hyperlink). 
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endangered species.220 This definition is more expansive than the one for gas 
pipelines; approximately 42% of the total hazardous liquid transmission pipeline 
grid lies within these areas or is near enough that a spill could affect the areas.221 
The difference can largely be explained by the use of census tracts, not by the 
inclusion of natural resource areas.222 The standards focus on a remarkably 
narrow list of environmental features.223  
The framework seeks to protect high-consequence areas in three different 
ways. First, it regulates more pipelines in these areas. The safety standards apply 
to gathering pipelines only if the pipelines are in or could affect the protected 
areas.224 In practice, this threshold is quite high. The vast majority of gathering 
pipelines built during the domestic energy revolution are unregulated because 
they are located in rural areas where the oil and gas wells are located.225 Second, 
when companies site new gas transmission pipelines in protected areas, they 
must comply with additional construction and operation requirements. As the 
number of buildings in the area around a gas transmission pipeline increases, 
for example, the pipeline must be able to withstand more pressure and use more 
closely spaced safety valves.226 Pipelines in navigable rivers, streams, and 
harbors must be buried at least forty-eight inches in soil or twenty-four inches 
in consolidated rock.227 And third, the framework requires operators of pipelines 
in protected areas to improve their risk management through special integrity 
management programs.228 In these programs, operators must assess the 
condition of the pipelines, identify threats to the lines, analyze the risks, and 
take “prompt action” to address defects and other anomalous conditions.229  
The states may choose to impose additional “compatible” safety 
requirements on intrastate pipelines, if they have a pipeline safety program 
                                                                                                                     
 220 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.6, .450 (2019). 
 221 HL IM Performance Measures, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/hazardous-liquid-integrity-management/hl-
im-performance-measures [https://perma.cc/ZSC7-B46X] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (follow 
“HL IM reporting data” hyperlink). 
 222 See Pipeline Safety: Areas Unusually Sensitive to Environmental Damage, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 80530, 80534 (Dec. 21, 2000) (explaining that the agency chose not to include many 
natural resources in its definition of “unusually sensitive areas” and that the definition would 
concentrate on “areas that are most susceptible to permanent or long-term damage”).  
 223 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.2, .6 (2019).  
 224 Id. §§ 192.9, 195.1–.2, .11.  
 225 See Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 20,722, 20,724 (proposed Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191, 192); 
Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 61,610, 61,612 
(proposed Oct. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 195). 
 226 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.111, .179 (2019). 
 227 Id. § 192.327(e). 
 228 Id. §§ 192.901–.951, 195.452. Operators of gas distribution pipeline systems are also 
required to create integrity management programs; the programs apply to the entire system 
because all of the pipelines are generally in populated areas. Id. §§ 192.1001–.1015. 
 229 Id. §§ 192.911, 195.452. 
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certified by PHMSA.230 All states except Alaska and Hawaii regulate the safety 
of intrastate gas pipelines.231 Just one-third of the states regulate the safety of 
intrastate hazardous liquid pipelines; this group includes some states with 
productive oil plays—but not, it must be noted, North Dakota.232 States 
generally retain the bright-line distinction between safety and siting in their 
delegated programs; indeed, several state legislatures have enacted an 
identically worded provision that prevents the delegated agency from 
prescribing the route of a pipeline.233 While the states have adopted numerous 
requirements that exceed the federal minimum standards—by one report there 
are over 1300 such requirements—the scope of the standards is largely limited 
to enhanced reporting, recordkeeping, and testing.234 Many states, for example, 
require operators to prepare more detailed maps of their systems than is 
mandated by PHMSA.235 Texas requires pipeline operators to obtain a permit 
from the state and to submit maps of systems in digital shape files.236 The states 
that do regulate the location of pipelines through their safety programs impose 
relatively minor restrictions.237 
C. The Siting Framework 
The legal framework governing the siting of new energy pipelines or the 
expansion of existing pipeline systems is a scattered collection of policy 
                                                                                                                     
 230 49 U.S.C. §§ 60104(c), 60105 (2012). 
 231 PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., STATE PROGRAM 
CERTIFICATION/AGREEMENT STATUS 1 (2017), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa 
.dot.gov/files/docs/about-phmsa/working-phmsa/state-programs/56591/2017-appendix 
-f-state-program-certification-agreement-status.pdf [https://perma.cc/S657-5PSS].  
 232 The states that regulate intrastate hazardous liquid pipelines are Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. See id. at 2. 
 233 See ALA. CODE § 37-4-80 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-15-203(7) (2015); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-542(6) (LexisNexis 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-3-13(E) 
(LexisNexis 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-5-920(h) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-28-104(5) 
(2015); W. VA. CODE § 24B-1-2(6) (2013). 
 234 Cf. NAT’L ASS’N PIPELINE SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES & NAT’L ASS’N REGULATORY 
UTIL. COMM’RS, PROVIDING INCREASED PUBLIC SAFETY LEVELS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 
(2d ed. 2013), https://www.puc.nh.gov/Safety/Compendium/State%20Initiative%20Exec 
%20Summary_Final%20091813.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPV9-SD7U]. 
 235 See, e.g., ARK. CODE R. § 192.615(d) (2015); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 4354.5(a)(1) 
(West 2010) (mobile home park operators); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-12.061 (2019); 
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 31.31.01.101.01 (2019). 
 236 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.70, 8.1 (2017); Mapping, RAILROAD COMM’N TEX., 
https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/pipeline-safety/mapping/ [https://perma.cc/Z8B5-XWQ3] (last 
updated Oct. 9, 2018).  
 237 See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-5-202(f) (2019) (prohibiting operators from 
constructing pipelines under buildings); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 460-20415 (2003) (limiting 
the location of sour gas pipelines); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:7-1.4 (2009) (requiring approval 
for high-pressure natural gas pipelines within 100 feet of a building). 
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decisions, divided across jurisdictions and fragmented by the type of pipeline, 
the product being transported, and whether the pipeline crosses state borders. 
States have authority under their police powers to regulate the route of gathering 
pipelines and gas distribution pipelines, but few states have chosen to do so. In 
effect, the decisions about the location of these pipelines—and the risks that a 
pipeline accident poses to communities and the environment—are left to the 
companies who will operate the lines. In contrast, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) approves the siting of interstate natural gas 
transmission pipelines,238 and some states have chosen to regulate the siting of 
other types of transmission pipelines.  
Given PHMSA’s authority over the safety of pipelines, the issue of whether 
other federal or state entities have the authority to consider the risks of an 
accident in their siting decisions is contested. At the federal level, FERC 
acknowledges PHMSA’s exclusive authority to set safety standards but claims 
the authority to impose conditions on interstate natural gas pipelines that 
“mitigate the impact of construction or operation on the environment.”239 As to 
states, the Pipeline Safety Act provides that states “may not adopt or continue 
in force safety standards” for interstate pipelines and certified states may only 
adopt additional or more stringent safety standards if they are “compatible” with 
federal minimum standards.240 There are no court decisions directly on point, 
but a state likely has the authority to regulate the siting of an interstate or 
intrastate pipeline based on the risk of an accident. Federal “safety standards” 
only apply to aspects such as design, construction, and operation—and PHMSA 
is not authorized to prescribe the location or route of a pipeline.241 But a state is 
likely preempted from imposing “safety standards” on the construction or 
operation of an interstate pipeline as a condition of siting approval,242 and may 
                                                                                                                     
 238 15 U.S.C. § 717f (c) (2012). 
 239 Memorandum of Understanding between the Dep’t of Transp. and the Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n Regarding Natural Gas Transportation Facilities 2 (Jan. 15, 1993) (on 
file with Ohio State Law Journal). 
 240 49 U.S.C. § 60104(c) (2012). 
 241 See Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Prince George’s Cty. Council, 711 F.3d 412, 422 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (“Even if we were to find that the [Pipeline Safety Act] has preemptive effect 
beyond the express preemption provision . . . we would not conclude that Congress intended 
the [law] to occupy the field of natural gas facility siting.”); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State 
Commerce Comm’n, 828 F.2d 465, 473 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that the state “may be able 
to enact legislation to protect its valuable topsoil and other aspects of the environment” but 
that the issue was not before the court); Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. South Portland, 288 
F. Supp. 3d 321, 430–31 (D. Me. 2017) (stating that “Congress did not intend the [Pipeline 
Safety Act] to preempt state and local authority ‘to prescribe the location or routing of a 
pipeline facility,’” that “[u]nder their police power, states and localities retain their ability to 
prohibit pipelines altogether in certain locations,” and that “it is unlikely Congress intended 
to remove [a lesser restriction than a ban]”).  
 242 See Kinley Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 999 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
“[t]his Congressional grant of exclusive federal regulatory authority [over interstate 
pipelines] precludes state decision-making in this area altogether and leaves no regulatory 
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be preempted from doing so as to intrastate pipelines if it is not certified to 
regulate the safety of those lines.243  
The siting of gathering pipelines, like the safety of the lines, is almost 
entirely unregulated. In oil and gas producing states, state commissions 
generally oversee gathering pipelines as part of their well permitting 
programs.244 This oversight does not extend to siting, however. Twenty-eight of 
the thirty states that assert jurisdiction over gathering pipelines do not require 
companies to obtain approval from the state commission to site gathering 
pipeline systems.245 These states accept the risks of the pipelines without regard 
to their location—presumably because they deem the risks of gathering 
pipelines to be so low that the location does not matter. Even the two states that 
require gathering pipeline companies to seek approval before constructing 
projects do not include a standard on risk in their siting criteria.246  
As companies have installed larger gathering pipelines and operated them 
at higher pressures, the states’ approach to risk has remained the same. The 
location of gathering systems is not regulated in states where much of the rapid 
build out has occurred during the domestic energy revolution, such as North 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Neither is the siting of systems 
in states where companies are expected to build many more gathering pipelines 
in the future: Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas.247 The states’ only concession 
                                                                                                                     
room for the state to either establish its own safety standards or supplement the federal safety 
standards”). 
 243 See Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. Seattle, 437 F.3d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that only certified state or local government agencies may regulate the safety of intrastate 
pipelines); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Skinner, 768 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D.R.I. 1991) (same). 
 244 See generally OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ORNL/TM-
2013/133, REVIEW OF EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS FOR GAS AND 
HAZARDOUS LIQUID GATHERING LINES (Sept. 2013), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/ 
phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Review%20of%20Existing%20Federal%20and%20State%20R
egulations%20for%20Gas%20and%20Hazardous%20Liquid%20Gathering%20Lines%2
0-%20May%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW32-UEEB]. 
 245 The states are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas (unregulated pipelines), Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See 
id. app. A at A-3 to -227 (providing the oil and gas gathering line rules and regulations for 
each state).  
 246 See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 400-1-8-.03 (2000) (requiring operators to obtain approval 
for “[a]ll intrastate gathering lines, located in a rural location” and specifying that 
information on the “[l]ocation, route and length of line” must be provided); 805 KY. ADMIN. 
REGS. 1:190 (2019) (requiring operators to obtain approval for all oil and gas gathering lines 
that are not federally regulated and specifying that the “approximate locations of property 
lines, dwellings, environmentally sensitive features and road and stream crossings along the 
path of the gathering line” must be provided). 
 247 As part of the state’s pipeline safety program, Texas requires regulated gathering 
pipelines to obtain a permit. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.70(a), 8.1(a)(1)(B), 8.1(b)(4) (2017). 
The state does not, however, approve the route of the pipelines.  
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to risk is to require operators to report the location of the systems.248 Ironically, 
the two states that require approval for gathering line projects—Alabama and 
Kentucky—do not have productive shale plays.249 
The siting of natural gas distribution pipelines is also generally not 
regulated. Investor-owned local distribution companies are governed by state 
public utility laws.250 As public utilities, the companies are expected to provide 
safe and adequate service at reasonable rates.251 Several states specifically 
require utilities to obtain a “certificate of convenience and public necessity” 
before construction of any facilities.252 Even so, the focus of certification is on 
the need for the service, the adequacy of the service, and the reasonableness of 
the cost of infrastructure—not on the location of pipelines.253 And states do not 
require utilities to obtain a certificate for expansions of existing systems within 
a service area;254 at most, a company might be required to obtain a city’s consent 
to construct pipelines under its public roads.255 Municipally owned utilities, 
meanwhile, oversee their own pipeline systems and routes.256 Leaving decisions 
about the risk of a route to distribution utilities presumes that the utility is best 
able to design its system, the possible routes are limited by the need to service 
customers, and distribution pipelines are operated at low pressures. Once again, 
the domestic energy revolution has not altered this perception of the risk—even 
as distribution utilities build more pipelines and transport more gas.  
                                                                                                                     
 248 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-26 (2014) (requiring all operators of 
underground gas and liquid gathering lines to submit geographic information system (GIS) 
data to the state within 180 days of putting the pipeline into service); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
4901:1-16-15 (2019) (requiring operators of gas gathering pipelines to notify the state prior 
to construction and after construction of the pipeline route); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 16, § 255.9(c) (2019) (requiring operators of gas gathering pipelines to notify 
the state prior to construction). 
 249 See U.S. States: State Profiles and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/state/ [https://perma.cc/E6U6-QTKA] (select “Rankings” from top 
menu, then “Crude Oil” or “Natural Gas”). 
 250 CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 5 (3d ed. 1993). 
 251 Id. 
 252 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-281(A) (2011) (“A public service 
corporation . . . shall not begin construction of . . . plant, service or system, or any extension 
thereof, without first having obtained from the commission a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity.”).  
 253 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-4-25(a) (2004) (listing criteria for a certificate that 
include the demand for the natural gas, the economic feasibility of the system, the propriety 
of the costs, and the effects on other distribution systems). 
 254 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-281(B) (2011) (“This section shall not require 
such corporation to secure a certificate for an extension within a city, county or town within 
which it has lawfully commenced operations, or for an extension into territory either within 
or without a city, county or town, contiguous to its . . . plant or system, and not served by a 
public service corporation of like character, or for an extension within or to territory already 
served by it, necessary in the ordinary course of its business.”). 
 255 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-102(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 256 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 15, § 2 (defining “public service corporations” as “[a]ll 
corporations other than municipal engaged in furnishing gas . . . for . . . fuel”). 
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In comparison to gathering and distribution pipelines, the location of 
transmission pipelines is more likely to be regulated. Authority over the siting 
of transmission pipelines is divided between the federal government and the 
states. At the federal level, the location of all interstate natural gas transmission 
pipeline projects must be approved by FERC.257 Jurisdiction over the location 
of other types of transmission lines—intrastate gas transmission lines and both 
interstate and intrastate crude oil and hydrocarbon liquid lines—is left to the 
states.258 Most of the siting laws were enacted well before the domestic energy 
revolution. FERC has exercised authority over interstate natural gas 
transmission projects since 1938.259 In the following decades, some states 
expanded their traditional authority over public utilities or common carriers to 
include the location of transmission pipelines.260 Others began to regulate 
transmission pipelines as “energy facilities” under general siting acts.261  
The states have split evenly on whether to approve transmission pipeline 
projects. Half of the states do not require pipeline companies to obtain approval 
for any type of transmission project;262 half require approval of at least one type 
of transmission pipeline system.263 More states regulate intrastate gas 
transmission projects than liquid transmission projects: twenty-three states 
require companies to obtain permission for intrastate gas transmission 
                                                                                                                     
 257 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2012). 
 258 FERC’s authority over interstate crude oil and hydrocarbon liquid pipelines is limited 
to economic regulation, which allows states to regulate the siting of these pipelines. See 
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 6 (1988). 
 259 Natural Gas Act, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938). 
 260 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 42.06.240(a) (2018) (requiring oil and gas pipeline carriers 
to obtain approval for pipeline construction as of January 1, 1974). 
 261 See THOMAS E. EBZERY & BRENT R. KUNZ, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW 
FOUND., PAPER 5: FACILITY SITING 5-1 (1981) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) 
(describing history of energy facility acts). 
 262 Twenty-five states do not specifically require approval for transmission pipeline 
projects, although public utility commissions may decide to review such projects if they are 
constructed by local distribution companies. The states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District of 
Columbia also does not require approval. In Colorado, county governments may choose to 
designate certain gas transmission pipeline projects as an “activity of state interest” and 
require approval before construction. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-104, -201 (2019). In 
Texas, transmission pipelines are required to obtain a permit from the state under the safety 
program but there is no siting review. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.70, 8.1 (2017). 
 263 Fourteen states require approval for intrastate gas, interstate liquid, and intrastate 
liquid transmission pipelines: Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Washington, and Wyoming. Nine states only require approval for intrastate gas transmission 
pipelines: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Vermont, 
and Virginia. Two states—Nebraska and Georgia— only require approval for liquid 
transmission pipelines. 
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projects,264 while sixteen states require the same for interstate and intrastate 
liquid transmission projects.265 Only two states—Georgia and Nebraska—have 
passed new siting laws to respond to the expansion in pipeline networks caused 
by the domestic energy revolution; both laws govern liquid transmission 
pipelines.266 
                                                                                                                     
 264 ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.06.240(a), .630 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-503(6)(C), 
-510(a) (2015) (greater than one mile and at least 125 psi); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1001, 
1002.5 (West 2010) (public utilities that add new natural gas capacity to the state); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 16-50i, -50k (2013) (at least 200 psi and design capacity of 20% of specified 
minimum yield strength); FLA. STAT. § 403.9405 (2015) (at least 15 miles in length and 
crosses a county line); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-401 (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.5 
(West 2019) (at least 5 miles in length and more than 150 psi); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, 
§§ 69G, 69J (2015) (more than 1 mile in length and 100 psi); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 483.109 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216G.02 (West 2010) (more than 275 psi); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-20-104(9)(b), -201 (2019) (greater than 50 miles in length and 25" 
in diameter); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 704.860, .865 (2014) (outside incorporated city); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 162-H:2(VII)(a), :5(I), :10-b (2014); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 120(2), 121 
(McKinney 2019) (more than 1000 feet in length and more than 125 psi); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 49-22.1-01(7)(a), -04 (2014) (at least one mile and more than 4.5" in diameter); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 4906.01(B)(1)(c), .04 (West Supp. 2019) (more than 500 feet in length, 9" in 
diameter, and 125 psi); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469.300(11)(a)(E)(ii), 320 (2017) (at least five 
miles in length and 16" in diameter); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-98-3, -4 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 49-41B-2.1(2), -4 (2004) (design capacity of at least 20% of specified minimum 
yield strength, exception for pipes less than 4" diameter, and one mile or less is constructed 
outside of public right-of-way); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(a)(3) (2017); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 56-265.2−.2:1 (2012) (owned by public utility); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 80.50.020(21)(b), .060 (West 2001) (at least 15 miles in length and greater than 14" in 
diameter that delivers to distribution facility); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1-101(a)(vi)(G), -2-
205 (2019).  
 265 ALASKA STAT. § 42.06.240(a) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-17-2, 22-3-83 (2019); 
220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-401 (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 479.5, 479B.4 (West 2009) (at 
least 5 miles in length and more than 150 psi); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, §§ 69G, 69J (2015) 
(more than 1 mile in length); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 792.10447(1)(c) (2010); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 216G.02 (West 2010) (at least 6" diameter); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-20-
104(9)(b)(i), -201 (2019) (greater than 50 miles in length and 25" in diameter); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 57-1404(2), -1405(1) (LexisNexis 2014) (greater than 6" diameter); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 162-H:2(VII)(a), :5(I) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22.1-01(7)(a), -04 
(2014) (at least one mile and more than 4.5" in diameter); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 469.300(11)(a)(E)(i), 320 (2017) (at least five miles in length and 6" in diameter); 42 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 42-98-3(d), -4 (2006) (“facilities associated with the transfer of oil . . . via 
pipeline”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 49-41B-2.1(2), -4 (2004) (design capacity of at least 20% 
of specified minimum yield strength, exception for pipes less than 4" diameter, and one mile 
or less is constructed outside of public right-of-way); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 80.50.020(21)(a), .060 (West 2001) (at least 15 miles in length and greater than 6" 
diameter); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1-101(a)(vi)(G), -2-205 (2019). In Oklahoma, companies 
may choose to apply to the state commission for an order authorizing “the siting, 
construction, expansion, or operation of a crude oil or refined petroleum product pipeline 
facility.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 67(D) (2011). 
 266 Phil McKenna, Property Rights Outcry Stops Billion-Dollar Pipeline Project in 
Georgia, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/ 
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This comprehensive analysis of federal and state siting laws reveals that 
pipeline siting laws take two different approaches to risk: (1) a public utility 
approach that views risk as one factor in a broad inquiry to determine whether 
the pipeline is in the public interest, or (2) a facility approach that views risk as 
an issue of the acceptability of the pipeline, separate from the question of public 
need. These approaches in turn reveal two different conceptions of energy 
infrastructure: in the first, energy infrastructure is a conduit for the beneficial 
provision of energy with inherent risks; in the second, it is a large land use that 
provides benefits but also has significant side effects that can be minimized.  
The first type of siting law draws on public utility concepts to holistically 
evaluate whether the project is in the public interest. The risk of pipeline 
accidents to communities and the environment is treated as a factor in a larger 
determination of public good. FERC uses this approach to determine whether to 
approve an interstate natural gas transmission pipeline project. In deciding 
whether the project “is or will be required by the present or future public 
convenience and necessity,”267 FERC must weigh the public benefits against 
the adverse effects of the project.268 The balancing test includes the effects of 
the pipeline on the surrounding community and potential disruption of the 
environment—both factors that could include the risk of accidents.269 FERC 
may also set “reasonable terms and conditions” on its approval.270  
Of the twenty-five states that approve pipeline projects, eight use a similar 
public utility approach.271 Like FERC, the states apply a balancing test to 
determine whether a pipeline is required by the “public convenience and 
necessity” or the “public interest.”272 Some states explicitly include negative 
                                                                                                                     
01042016/palmetto-pipeline-kinder-morgan-georgia-eminent-domain-oil-gas-republicans 
[https://perma.cc/7W9F-DR2G]; Kevin O’Hanlon, Governor Signs Two Pipeline Bills into 
Law, LINCOLN J. STAR (Nov. 22, 2011), https://journalstar.com/news/unicameral/ 
governor-signs-two-oil-pipeline-bills-into-law/article_81853373-b52c-537b-9a7d-e8 
4b813faa9c.html [https://perma.cc/BB2X-M3N5]. Nebraska created a special siting 
process for the Keystone XL pipeline. 2012 Neb. Laws L.B. 1161 (codified at NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 57-1101). While landowners challenged the law as unconstitutional, the state 
supreme court upheld it. See Sandra Zellmer, Keystone XL Pipeline Route through Nebraska 
Upheld on Constitutional Technicality—For Now, CPRBLOG (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www 
.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=EEC8FFCB-942B-4764-55172CC3E973E 
EF8 [https://perma.cc/Q45G-K6HJ].  
 267 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2012). 
 268 Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 
(1999), clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, further clarified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000) (Policy 
Statement). 
 269 Id. 
 270 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2012). 
 271 The states are Alaska, California, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, Virginia, and 
Wyoming. See infra note 272. 
 272 ALASKA STAT. § 42.06.270(a) (2018); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1001, 1002.5 (West 
2010); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-401 (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.12 (West 2009); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 483.109 (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-1407(4) 
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effects on the environment and “public safety” among the balancing factors.273 
In Illinois, for example, the law directs the commission to consider the 
environmental impact, the impact on natural resources, and the impact on public 
safety of the project.274 Other states grant decision-makers the authority to 
impose conditions to address negative effects, thereby implicitly including these 
effects in the balancing test.275 In Iowa, the board has authority to impose 
conditions on intrastate pipelines as to “safety requirements” that are 
“determined by it to be just and proper.”276 But the only state that directly 
addresses the risk of an accident in its siting law—Nebraska—prohibits its 
commission from considering the “risk or impact of spills or leaks” in its 
determination that the route is in “the public interest.”277 
While the public utility approach considers environmental effects and 
public safety, it presumes that the risk of an accident is a generic factor inherent 
to the project—that is, an issue of whether the product will remain in the pipe—
rather than an issue that can be proactively solved through a land use decision. 
FERC and the states that use this approach view the risk of accidents across the 
entire pipeline as acceptable and rely on the safety framework, rather than the 
location of the pipeline, to protect vulnerable areas. For example, FERC 
responded to a landowner’s concern about the safety of the Rover Pipeline, the 
largest-capacity natural gas pipeline ever considered by the Commission, by 
stating that the “minimal number of incidents distributed over more than 
300,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines indicates a low risk for an 
incident at any given location.”278 FERC requires pipeline operators to certify 
that the project complies with PHMSA’s safety standards but does not otherwise 
seek to reduce the risk of accidents.279 Similarly, states that weigh public safety 
                                                                                                                     
(LexisNexis 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-265.2(A)(1) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-205 
(2019). 
 273 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1002(a)(4) (West 2010); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-401(c) 
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-1407(4) (LexisNexis 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-
265.2:1(A) (2012). In Wyoming, the statute is unclear, but the rules require applicants to 
provide information on the facility and site. 2-3 WYO. CODE R. § 21 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 274 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-401(b)(1), (3), (4) (2013). 
 275 IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.12 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-265.2:1(A) (2012); see 
also ALASKA STAT. § 42.06.240(d) (2018) (the state commission may impose conditions 
“necessary for the protection of the environment” and for the “best interest” of the oil or gas 
pipeline and the general public). 
 276 IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.12 (West 2009); cf. id. § 479B.9 (authorizing conditions on 
interstate hazardous liquid transmission pipelines only “as to location and route”). 
 277 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-1407(4) (LexisNexis 2014). According to the state’s law, 
the purpose of this provision is to “acknowledge[] and respect[] the exclusive federal 
authority over safety issues established by the federal . . . Pipeline Safety Act . . . and the 
express preemption provision stated in that act.” Id. § 57-1402(2) (2014). As discussed supra 
notes 239–43 and accompanying text, this is an overly restrictive interpretation of the state’s 
authority. 
 278 Rover Pipeline LLC, 158 FERC ¶ 61,109, at 85 (2017). 
 279 18 C.F.R. § 157.14(a)(10)(vi) (2019) (requiring an applicant to “certify that it will 
design, install, inspect, test, construct, operate, replace, and maintain the facilities for which 
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in a siting decision view the risk as negligible and defer to federal safety 
standards rather than address the potential harm through the route. Illinois280 
and Iowa,281 for example, compared the generic risks of pipeline transportation 
of crude oil against rail transportation and determined that the Dakota Access 
Pipeline was much safer. The states ultimately relied on PHMSA’s standards 
and the pipeline operator’s private commitments to protect the public and the 
environment.282  
The second type of siting law draws on land use planning concepts to 
recognize the significant impacts of locating and operating energy facilities on 
communities and the environment. In this approach, the risk of a pipeline is 
treated as a distinct issue that must be addressed before siting, separate from the 
benefits of the pipeline. The decision-maker—which may be a public utility 
commission or a designated siting board or council283—must consider the 
public need for and the effects of the project. But rather than weigh the benefits 
against the risks, the decision-maker must determine that the pipeline fulfills a 
public need and that the negative effects of the pipeline are acceptable. 
Seventeen states utilize the facility approach for the pipelines they regulate, 
making this approach the more popular of the two approaches to risk. Most of 
the states adopted general energy facility siting acts in the 1970s and included 
                                                                                                                     
a certificate is requested in accordance with Federal safety standards and plans for 
maintenance and inspection or shall certify that it has been granted a waiver of the 
requirements of the safety standards by the Department of Transportation”). As noted supra 
in note 239 and accompanying text, FERC has agreed to defer to PHMSA on the safety of 
interstate natural gas pipelines. 
 280 Dakota Access, LLC, Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 14-0754, at 17 (Dec. 16, 2015) (citing 
testimony by a representative of Dakota Access). 
 281 Dakota Access, LLC, Iowa Utils. Bd., HLP-2014-0001, at 32 (Mar. 10, 2016), aff’d, 
Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829, 842 (Iowa 2019) (holding that data supported 
the conclusion that pipeline transportation is safer than rail transportation). 
 282 See Dakota Access, LLC, 14-0754 at 27 (concluding that the evidence of PHMSA 
safety standards in the record was sufficient to determine that the public convenience and 
necessity required the pipeline); Dakota Access, LLC, HLP-2014-0001 at 54–58 (asserting 
authority to “consider the future safety of the proposed pipeline in connection with the 
decision of whether to issue a permit for the construction of the pipeline” but determining 
that PHMSA’s safety standards and additional industry commitments were “reasonable steps 
to reduce the safety risks”). 
 283 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50j (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.030 
(West 2001). 
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at least some transmission pipelines in the definition of a facility.284 A few states 
apply the approach only to transmission pipelines.285 
The siting laws that take this approach vary in their phrasing of the 
acceptability determination. In some states, the decision-maker must find that 
the facility “represents the minimum adverse” or “acceptable” environmental 
impact considering “available technology” and “the nature and economics of 
the various alternatives.”286 In others, the requirement is phrased in the 
negative—the facility may not create an “unacceptable,” “unreasonable,” 
“serious,” or “undue” adverse environmental effect.287 Several of the states 
include safety as a criterion that must be acceptable,288 and some prohibit the 
siting of transmission pipelines that pose an “undue hazard to persons or 
property along the area traversed by the line.”289  
While the facility approach views a pipeline as a large land use and focuses 
the decision-maker on the risk of that pipeline, the laws still treat the risk of the 
project as a single determination. This is likely because the prototypical energy 
facility is a power plant, which is sited in one location. Even the references to 
                                                                                                                     
 284 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-503(6)(C) (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50i(a)(2) 
(2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 69G (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-104(9)(b) 
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.860(3) (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-H:2(VII)(a) 
(2014); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 120(2) (McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22.1-
01(7)(a) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.01(B)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2019); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 469.300(11)(a)(E) (2017); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-98-3(d) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 49-41B-2(7), -2.1(2) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.50.020(11), (21) (West 
2001). 
 285 FLA. STAT. § 403.9405(1) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-17-1(10), -2 (2012); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 216G.02 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(a)(3) (2017). Minnesota 
also has a general energy facility siting law that includes some transmission pipelines, but it 
focuses on need. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.43 (West 2010). 
 286 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-519(b)(4) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-301(1)(c) 
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.890(1)(d) (2014); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126(1)(c) 
(McKinney 2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10(A)(3) (West Supp. 2019); see also 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 463-14-020 (2004) (“Ensuring through available and reasonable 
methods that the location and operation of such facilities will produce minimal adverse 
effects on the environment . . . .”). 
 287 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-H:16(IV)(c) (2014); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-98-
11(b)(3) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-22(2) (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, 
§ 248(b)(5) (2017). 
 288 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50p(a)(3)(B) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 403.9415(4)(e) (2015); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 69O(2) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-301(2)(d) (2019); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-H:16(IV)(c) (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.501(1)(g) (2017); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-22(3) (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(b)(5) (2017); see 
also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-98-8(a)(5)-(6) (2006) (requiring information on estimated costs 
to the community on safety issues and measures to protect public safety as part of the 
application). 
 289 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-519(b)(8) (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50p(a)(3)(E) 
(2013); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126(1)(f) (McKinney 2019); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 12-
17-4(a) (2012) (prohibiting the siting of transmission pipelines that create “an undue hazard 
to the environment and natural resources of this state”). 
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the “hazard” of a potential pipeline presume that the line either poses an undue 
hazard or it does not. Thus, the facility approach does not encourage decision-
makers to consider the siting of linear infrastructure as a series of risk decisions 
that shift based on the potential consequences of an accident. Nor does the 
approach necessarily create a proactive response to risk by empowering the 
decision-maker to choose the best route. South Dakota’s law, for example, 
prohibits its commission from establishing a route.290  
A few states that utilize the approach seek to protect vulnerable areas from 
the consequences of a pipeline accident. In Florida, the state board certifies a 
corridor for a gas transmission pipeline after considering whether the pipeline 
“[a]void[s] densely populated areas to the maximum extent feasible.”291 
Similarly, in Minnesota, the commission considers criteria such as the 
“existence of populated areas” in designating a pipeline route.292 North Dakota 
is the only state to explicitly protect certain areas. The route of a pipeline may 
not traverse any “exclusion” areas such as national and state parks, historic sites, 
and wilderness areas.293 The company must also avoid other sensitive areas, 
such as drinking water sources, unless there is no reasonable alternative.294 In 
determining whether there is a reasonable alternative, the commission can weigh 
the management of adverse impacts, orderly siting, system reliability and 
integrity, and efficient use of resources.295 
South Dakota’s and North Dakota’s reviews of the Dakota Access Pipeline 
demonstrate the limitations of the facility approach to risk. South Dakota’s 
siting law requires the operator to demonstrate that the pipeline will not “pose a 
threat of serious injury to the environment” or “substantially impair the health, 
safety or welfare of the inhabitants.”296 But the commission concluded that the 
operator met these requirements by complying with PHMSA’s safety 
standards.297 The commission also concluded that it could not “compel the 
[a]pplicant to select an alternative route” or base its decision “on whether . . . the 
selected route is the route [the state] might itself select.”298  
North Dakota’s siting law protects vulnerable areas, yet the state 
commission’s application of the law is much less demanding than the text would 
seem to require. The law prohibits a pipeline from being routed through an 
“exclusion” area, which includes critical habitat for endangered and threatened  
 
                                                                                                                     
 290 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-36 (2004). 
 291 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.9415(4)(g) (West 2010). 
 292 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216G.02, subdiv. 3(b)(4) (West 2010). Recognizing the issue of 
preemption, Minnesota prohibits the commission from “set[ting] safety standards for the 
construction of pipelines.” Id. § 216G.02, subdiv. 3(a).  
 293 N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22.1-03 (2014); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-08-02(1) (2019). 
 294 N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22.1-03 (2014); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-08-02(2) (2019). 
 295 N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-08-02(2). 
 296 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-22(2)–(3) (2004). 
 297 Dakota Access, LLC, HP14-002, at 13 (S.D. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Dec. 14, 2015). 
 298 Id. at 24–25. 
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species.299 The commission, however, interpreted this as a prohibition on 
surface impacts and allowed the Dakota Access Pipeline to be bored underneath 
critical habitat in the Missouri River.300 When Energy Transfer Partners 
proposed a tank terminal on the other side of a city’s groundwater supply 
protection area, the commission concluded that there was no reasonable 
alternative to routing the pipeline through the area even though the operator had 
created the dilemma.301 
The figure below shows which states have adopted transmission pipeline 
siting laws and the approaches they use to assess risk. Most of the states that 
regulate pipeline siting are in the North and along the West and East Coasts. The 
author’s future research will explore relationships between the states’ policy 
choices and pipeline risk characteristics, but it is interesting to note that states 
with extensive transmission pipeline systems, such as Texas and Louisiana, 
have not adopted siting laws. There is also no obvious correlation between the 
type of pipeline and the type of policy approach. The two states that adopted 
pipeline siting laws in response to the domestic energy revolution—Georgia and 
Nebraska—chose different policy approaches to address the same type of 
pipeline. Instead, it appears that certain geographic regions prefer one approach, 
perhaps because the states in that region look to each other for policy models. 
The Northeast and the northern states in the Mountain West use the facility 
approach, while states in the Midwest and the Plains are more likely to use the 
public utility approach.  
                                                                                                                     
 299 N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22.1-03 (2014); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-08-02(1) (2019). 
 300 Dakota Access, LLC, PU-14-842, at 7 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 20, 2016). 
 301 Id. at 8. 
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IV. EVALUATING THE RISK FRAMEWORKS 
These regulatory frameworks raise descriptive and normative questions of 
risk governance—how society makes collective decisions about the 
acceptability of risk, and how it should make such decisions.302 A common 
governance approach to environmental, health, and safety risks is to separate the 
decision on siting from the decision on the ongoing risk of the industrial 
activity.303 This approach presumes that the decision about the location of a 
source of risk can be divorced from a decision about the acceptable level of 
risk—or that the distinction is not important because the risk can be managed 
regardless of its geographic location. Both presumptions can be questioned.304 
But even if the distinction is valid, one would expect risk governance to adopt a 
more cautious approach when the potential for catastrophic harm increases and 
the ability to predict the consequences of the next accident decreases.  
A. The Risk Policy Approaches 
In risk governance, there are three primary policy approaches: a 
preventative approach, a management approach, and a remedial approach.305 
                                                                                                                     
 302 See ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX 
WORLD 8–9 (2008) (describing risk governance as “structures and processes for collective 
decision-making involving governmental and non-governmental actors” as applied to the 
“context of risk and risk-related decision-making,” which includes the “complex web of 
actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk 
information is collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are 
taken”); Timothy F. Malloy, Disrupting Conventional Policy: The Three Faces of 
Nanotechnology, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2010) (defining risk governance as 
“the social, legal and institutional decision-making processes used in identifying and 
responding to risks facing society”). 
 303 Major environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act do not 
directly address siting by specifying the best location for a facility. See Rodger C. Field, 
Siting, Justice, and the Environmental Laws, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 639, 645–46 (1996). 
Instead, the laws accept the proposed site as a given and set pollution standards based on the 
environmental characteristics of the area. See id. at 645.  
 304 For example, environmental justice advocates have criticized environmental law on 
the grounds that polluting facilities are sited more often in communities of color and poor 
communities, and general environmental standards do not adequately protect these 
communities. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between 
Environmental Laws and “Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 268–75 (1997). For a specific 
critique of risk, see Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of 
Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 119 (1996). 
 305 This typology builds off my earlier work on hydraulic fracturing policy. See Sara 
Gosman et al., Chemical Use, in HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN MICHIGAN: 
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT 85, 85–86 (Sept. 2015), http://graham.umich.edu/ 
media/pubs/HF-IA-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3XH-RZPW]. Risk scholars 
classify policies in different ways. See, e.g., Andreas Klinke & Ortwin Renn, A New 
Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: Risk-Based, Precaution-Based, and 
Discourse-Based Strategies, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 1071, 1071 (2002) (proposing three 
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Each policy approach chooses to intercede at a different point in the risk 
timeline, from before the risk-creating activity begins to after harm occurs. 
Underlying this choice are distinct risk philosophies—from policies that focus 
primarily on protecting the public and the environment to those that consciously 
allow some harm. Each approach is thus built on a particular characterization of 
risk, a judgment about the acceptability of risk, and an assumption about the 
efficacy of policy measures to respond to risk. While the approaches are 
conceptually independent, they are not mutually exclusive. A policymaker can 
apply multiple approaches to the same risk activity.  
In the preventative approach, policymakers respond to risk through 
measures that avert harm.306 At the extreme, a preventative policy embraces the 
strong version of the precautionary principle and prohibits an activity unless the 
risk creator can demonstrate that the activity would be safe.307 More 
pragmatically, a preventative policy protects communities and the environment 
from the worst harms.308 By seeking to prevent harm, the policy approach treats 
negative consequences as unacceptable—either because from a technocratic 
perspective the benefits of the activity do not justify the risks, or because the 
public perceives the risks to be intolerable regardless of the benefits. From a 
democratic governance perspective, the policy approach is particularly suited to 
“dread” risks that evoke significant public concern because they cause fatalities, 
create the potential for catastrophic outcomes, are not controllable, and do not 
equally distribute the risks and benefits.309 The policy approach is also suited to 
                                                                                                                     
strategies). The typology in this Article most closely resembles one by Professor Malloy, 
who divides chemical risk policies into “prevention based” and “conventional risk 
management,” but I categorize certain policy measures differently and add a category of 
remedial approaches. See generally Timothy F. Malloy, Principled Prevention, 46 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 105 (2014) (identifying and evaluating structural approaches to risk policy).  
 306 See NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL 
SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 61–90 (2002) (describing “the principle of prevention”); Malloy, 
supra note 305, at 109. Here, I use “prevention” to mean hazard avoidance. See John S. 
Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 13, 36–39 (2002) (describing the hazard paradigm). 
 307 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND 
ECOLOGICAL RISK: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1513–16 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002) 
(describing different precaution models). For a discussion of the difference between 
prevention and precaution, see ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–43 (Daniel Bodansky & David 
Freestone eds., 2002). 
 308 See Malloy, supra note 305, at 149 (stating that “one can adopt a prevention-based 
approach without embracing the precautionary principle”); Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid 
of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 36–75 (2005) (describing range 
of preventative or precautionary actions in U.S. environmental law). 
 309 See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 282–83 (1987); cf. CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126–28 (2005) (arguing 
that policymakers should not necessarily respond to public fear of certain risks). 
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risks that are uncertain, in the sense that the probability cannot be calculated or 
the consequences are unknown.310  
In the management approach, policymakers respond to risk through 
measures that limit the risk of harm. A management policy permits an activity 
to occur while imposing controls that reduce—but do not prevent—risk.311 
While the activity still has the potential to create harm, the risk is acceptable 
because the benefits of the activity outweigh the risks or the public perceives 
the risks to be tolerable. In a technocratic paradigm in which risks are just 
another policy problem to be competently managed, policymakers can adopt 
this approach to address a range of risks with different characteristics.312 But 
because management depends on the presumption that policy measures can 
reliably reduce risk to an acceptable level,313 the approach is best suited to 
regulating risk-creating activities with more familiar characteristics. From a 
democratic governance perspective, management is also appropriate for risks 
that do not evoke the same level of public concern—that is, they are 
controllable; voluntary; known to the public; have immediate, observable 
effects; or are more equitable in the distribution of risks and benefits.314  
In the remedial approach, policymakers respond to risk through measures 
that reduce the harm after an accident. A remedial policy allows an activity but 
requires the risk creator to plan for emergencies and to take immediate action 
when harm occurs.315 The approach accepts not only the presence of risk, but 
also the inevitability of some damage—because it presumes that remedial 
measures can lessen the consequences to an acceptable level.316 It is best suited 
to respond to risks that create large benefits and cause the type of harm that can 
                                                                                                                     
 310 The traditional formulation of the precautionary principle provides that policymakers 
should take action to prevent threats of serious or irreversible harm even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty. See Percival, supra note 308, at 22–36; see also Slovic, supra note 
309, at 282–83 (describing the public’s concern about “unknown” risks that are new, latent, 
or not observable). 
 311 See Malloy, supra note 305, at 112 (describing conventional risk management as 
“setting ‘acceptable’ exposure levels and relying on engineering controls to achieve such 
levels”). 
 312 For descriptions of the acceptability of risk in the “risk paradigm,” see SIDNEY A. 
SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 3–13 (2003); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, 
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 264–66 (1991). 
 313 Cf. Malloy, supra note 305, at 134–35 (discussing potential ineffectiveness of control 
measures). 
 314 See Slovic, supra note 309, at 282–83. 
 315 Cf. Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the Risk 
Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 235–36 
(2017) (describing ex post governance tools such as liability and resilience as “attempting to 
mitigate or minimize, sometimes inevitable, harm after it occurs”); see also David B. Graham 
& Thomas D. Johns, Emergency Response Planning: A Critical Investment, 20 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 49, 49–50 (2006).  
 316 Cf. John Wyeth Griggs, BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 32 ENERGY L.J. 57, 63–68 
(2011) (describing weaknesses in BP’s spill response planning). 
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be easily controlled.317 This approach can be combined with a management 
approach, since it addresses the remaining potential for harm. To the extent the 
approach is used by itself, it is suited to risks that create less significant 
consequences, such as activities that do not cause catastrophic harm, many 
fatalities, or widespread property damage.318  
Energy pipelines benefit consumers and the economy, but they also pose 
catastrophic risks to populated and environmentally sensitive areas. Because a 
pipeline accident is more likely to cause extreme consequences than would be 
expected, the scale of a future accident is difficult to predict based on past 
events.319 As companies build ever more pipelines across the United States, a 
preventative policy approach would seem best suited to addressing the risks to 
the areas where the consequences of an accident would be most severe.  
But when the safety and siting frameworks are combined, they take a 
markedly constrained approach to prevention. The safety framework seeks to 
prevent risk using engineering standards that regulate the design, installation, 
and construction of pipelines.320 Once the pipelines are constructed, the safety 
framework works backward to reduce the risks to a limited number of 
vulnerable areas through special requirements such as risk management 
programs.321 The siting framework largely defers to the engineering and 
management standards in safety regulation, rather than take its own preventative 
approach. To address the inevitable accidents that follow management policies, 
the safety framework takes a remedial approach and requires pipeline operators 
to plan for emergencies and respond promptly.322  
The frameworks treat risk as a technical problem in the physical pipeline 
systems and as a management problem in the organizations that operate those 
systems, not as a problem of incompatible land uses. This vision of risk reifies 
pipelines and organizations, extracting the problem from the particulars of the 
surrounding communities and environment. It frames the risk as controllable 
rather than catastrophic, and places decision-making in the hands of experts 
instead of land use planners. Finally, it presumes that the policy measures can 
effectively reduce risk to an acceptable level, putting faith in the engineering 
standards and technologies that prevent and reduce risk—as well as in remedial 
measures to minimize the effects of a spill or release.  
                                                                                                                     
 317 See Marchant & Stevens, supra note 315, at 246 (arguing that ex post governance is 
appropriate for technologies that have major net safety benefits but also cause accidents). 
 318 See Slovic, supra note 309, at 282–83. 
 319 Cf. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill 
Catastrophes: The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717, 1734 
(2011) (“There are two implications of catastrophes being characterized by fat-tailed 
distributions. First, where disasters are concerned, the past may not be prologue. A future 
disaster could easily be many times worse. Second, a single extreme outcome may readily 
account for most of the losses from a particular type of catastrophe.”). 
 320 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.51–329, 195.100–.264. 
 321 Id. §§ 192.901–.951, .1001–.1015, 195.452. 
 322 Id. §§ 192.605(a), (e), .615, 195.402(a), (e). 
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In viewing the risk problem as a pipeline problem or an operator 
management problem, the frameworks follow an approach that emerged from 
the pipeline industry. The division between “safety” and “siting” began in the 
industry’s safety codes. Originally, the pipeline industry regulated safety itself, 
using standards developed by private standard-setting organizations.323 The 
codes viewed risk as a private engineering decision, not as a public decision 
about land use. They assumed that an operator had already selected a route and 
addressed the risk through technical and operational requirements.324 In the 
1950s, the states began adopting the codes as safety regulations for public 
utilities.325 Congress accepted this narrow vision of safety and gave the new 
Department of Transportation authority to set standards for natural gas 
pipelines,326 then adopted the same approach for liquid pipelines.327  
Siting laws, where they exist, primarily treat pipelines as inert construction 
projects. They seek to prevent and mitigate short-term “effects” more than long-
term risk. Indeed, states that regulate the siting of both gas and liquid 
transmission pipelines use the same criteria, indicating that the focus of the laws 
is on the pipeline more than on the product it transports. Only one state—North 
Dakota—has adopted a completely preventative approach to ensure that 
transmission pipelines will not harm protected areas. But even this siting law 
takes a relatively narrow approach to prevention that appears to be focused on 
construction effects. The excluded areas are lands that have already been 
protected for their recreational or historical value by the federal government or 
state: national and state parks, historic sites, and wilderness areas.328 The only 
private lands that are excluded are those that serve as habitat for threatened, 
endangered, unique, or rare species.329  
In theory, laws that require agencies to analyze alternatives to the route of a 
pipeline should lead to pipelines that are sited away from vulnerable areas. 
Under NEPA and similar “stop and think” state laws, agencies must compare 
the environmental effects of the proposal against the alternatives.330 Several of 
the pipeline siting laws also require the decision-maker to consider alternate 
routes.331 Even if the laws do not mandate approval of the route with the least 
                                                                                                                     
 323 See FED. POWER COMM’N, 89TH CONG., SAFETY OF INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS 
PIPELINES 5–6 (Comm. Print 1966). 
 324 See id. at 5 (describing the industry code for natural gas pipelines as a “consensus of 
informed engineering judgment as to minimum construction requirements for safety”).  
 325 Id. at 126–27 tbls.3 & 4. 
 326 Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481, 82 Stat. 720.  
 327 Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-129, 93 Stat. 989. 
 328 N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-08-02(1) (2019). 
 329 Id. 
 330 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012); Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). State laws include the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West 2016).  
 331 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50l(a)(1)(D) (Supp. 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 403.9412 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.6(8) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 162-H:7(V)(b) (2014). 
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impacts, the analysis should create external and internal pressure on the agency 
to make the best decision.332 In practice, however, the evaluation of alternatives 
is limited by the same divide between siting and safety. In FERC’s 
environmental analysis of the Rover pipeline, for example, the commission 
compared the surface environmental impacts of the alternative routes but not the 
consequences of an accident.333 When FERC evaluated the safety of the 
pipeline, it took the location of the pipeline as a given and relied on PHMSA’s 
more stringent design and management standards to control the risk of accidents 
in more densely populated areas.334 FERC ultimately concluded “that [the 
pipeline] would represent a slight increase in risk to the nearby public.”335 This 
conclusion points to a deeper concern about using laws such as NEPA to 
compare risks. It is particularly difficult for agencies to predict low-probability, 
high-consequence events in a changing risk landscape because the frequency 
and consequences of accidents in the past do not necessarily predict the 
future.336  
B. The Results 
The failure of risk governance to take a robust preventative policy approach 
to the catastrophic risks posed by energy pipelines to vulnerable areas creates 
four negative effects: (1) it leads to more pipeline accidents that cause the worst 
harms; (2) it places a significant burden on the public and local governments to 
manage risk; (3) it relies disproportionately on emergency response measures to 
mitigate harm; and (4) it encourages pipeline operators to build more pipelines 
than is efficient.  
                                                                                                                     
 332 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) 
(explaining that environmental analysis forces action by “ensur[ing] that the 
agency . . . will . . . carefully consider . . . detailed information concerning significant 
environmental impacts . . . [and] guarantee[ing] that the relevant information will be made 
available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process 
and the implementation of that decision”).  
 333 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FERC/FEIS-0267F, ROVER PIPELINE, 
PANHANDLE BACKHAUL, AND TRUNKLINE BACKHAUL PROJECTS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT 3-10 to -35 (July 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/ 
eis/2016/07-29-16-rover-pipeline/impact-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV7V-87SV] 
[hereinafter FERC, ROVER PIPELINE FINAL EIS]. The criteria included residences within 50 
feet, but this criterion must have measured nuisance impacts; the potential impact radius of 
an explosion is 628 to 1100 feet. Id. at 4-270. 
 334 Id. at 4-258 to -267. 
 335 Id. at 4-264 to -266, -271. The Commission also presented a risk ladder that showed 
that the annual number of deaths from tractor turnovers was higher than the deaths from 
natural gas pipelines, a statistic unlikely to sway anyone concerned about the involuntary 
risks of pipelines. Id. at 4-271.  
 336 See Jamison E. Colburn, Necessarily Unpredictable? Oil Spill Risks Beyond the 
Horizon, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 307, 328 (2011) (explaining the challenges of assessing low-
probability, high-consequence risks under NEPA and contending that frequentist data from 
past accidents fails to predict unprecedented events like Deepwater Horizon). 
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First, the lack of a preventative approach leads to more pipeline accidents 
and to more catastrophic harm to the environment and the public from pipeline 
accidents. Because the regulatory frameworks do not require the risk of an 
accident to be taken into account when a pipeline is sited, it is not surprising that 
operators continue to build energy pipelines in or near highly populated and 
environmentally sensitive areas when it makes economic sense to do so.337 
Approximately 7% of natural gas transmission pipelines and 42% of hazardous 
liquid transmission pipelines are located in areas where PHMSA has determined 
that an accident could have significant consequences.338 And during the energy 
revolution, companies have continued to build transmission pipelines—
particularly the interstate pipelines that are more likely to pose significant 
risks—in high-consequence areas at the same pace as pipelines in other areas.339 
Of course, pipelines must sometimes be built in a specific location.340 But 
operators appear to have significant latitude to choose the path from one point 
to another, particularly when they construct new “greenfield” projects.341 For 
large projects such as the Keystone XL pipeline, operators have proposed 
                                                                                                                     
 337 Operators contend that they select routes to avoid vulnerable areas. See, e.g., INGAA 
FOUND., BUILDING INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINES: A PRIMER 8–9 
(Jan. 2013), https://www.ingaa.org/file.aspx?id=19618 [https://perma.cc/3RL5-GFL5]. 
Operators would have a strong incentive to take preventative actions to protect areas such as 
wetlands that are subject to environmental regulation. From an economic perspective, 
operators would use private risk governance to protect other areas when the social or 
expected liability costs of siting the pipeline in that location outweigh the economic benefits. 
Judging from the data, these costs are not high enough to encourage operators to avoid high-
consequence areas.  
 338 As described supra in Part III.B., a “high-consequence area” is an imperfect measure 
of potential harm. For natural gas pipelines, the measure likely understates the risk of 
catastrophic harm because the definition only includes very densely populated areas. For 
hazardous liquid pipelines, the measure is both over- and under-inclusive. The definition 
currently includes a pipeline if an accident could affect a municipal census tract but not if it 
could affect the Great Lakes. See Pipeline Safety: Public Meeting on Unusually Sensitive 
Area Definitions and Pipeline Awareness and Engagement, 84 Fed. Reg. 24,593, 24,593 
(May 28, 2019) (stating that PHMSA is considering how to include the Great Lakes, coastal 
beaches, and marine coastal waters in its definition in order to meet a 2016 statutory 
requirement).  
 339 HL IM Performance Measures, supra note 221 (follow “HL IM reporting data” 
hyperlink, then select “Interstate” from drop-down menu) (reporting that interstate hazardous 
liquid pipelines in or near high-consequence areas grew from 53,491.33 miles in 2010 to 
66,101.81 miles in 2018); GT IM Performance Measures, supra note 219 (follow “GT IM 
Assessment” hyperlink, then select “Interstate” from drop-down menu) (reporting that 
interstate gas transmission pipelines in high-consequence areas grew from 8035.28 miles in 
2010 to 9258.86 miles in 2018). The proportion of interstate pipelines that could affect high-
consequence areas to total pipelines has remained roughly the same. 
 340 For example, natural gas distribution pipelines, which provide natural gas to 
residences and businesses, will by necessity be located in densely populated areas. But the 
same is not generally true of transmission pipelines. 
 341 Cf. INGAA FOUND., supra note 337, at 10 (“‘[G]reenfield,’ or new, projects may 
have more routing flexibility when the pipelines cover long distances.”). 
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substantial changes to the pipeline route when required to submit route 
alternatives to a federal or state agency.342  
According to PHMSA’s accident data, pipelines located in high-
consequence areas are more likely to have spills or releases than pipelines 
located in other, “low-consequence” areas.343 This is in part because the external 
threats to pipelines are greater in such areas.344 But even if the likelihood of an 
accident were the same in both types of areas, the siting of a pipeline in a high-
consequence area instead of a low-consequence area would result in greater 
harm over the long term. A spill or release from a pipeline in a high-consequence 
area is, by definition, more likely to cause severe effects than the same accident 
in a low-consequence area.345  
PHMSA has tried to reduce the risk of accidents in high-consequence areas 
by requiring operators to develop integrity management programs to identify, 
assess, and manage threats to the integrity of their pipelines.346 Even putting 
aside the limited number of communities and natural resources protected by 
these programs, the effectiveness of the approach to risk is debatable. If the 
programs were designed to deter operators from siting new pipelines in high-
consequence areas, the additional cost of the requirements does not appear to 
have altered the operators’ decisions. Nor have these risk management programs 
been successful in lowering the number of accidents or the total amount of 
damage; the rate of transmission pipeline accidents in high-consequence areas 
has stayed the same or increased since the programs went into effect.347 Indeed, 
the incidents that have caused the greatest harm have occurred recently and in 
high-consequence areas.348  
                                                                                                                     
 342 See, e.g., Application, Transcanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., Neb. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, No. OP-0003, at 2–8 (2017) (describing alternative routes).  
 343 See HL IM Performance Measures, supra note 221 (follow “HL IM reporting data” 
hyperlink); National Pipeline Performance Measures, supra note 177 (follow “Onshore 
Significant Incident HCA” hyperlink).  
 344 See National Pipeline Performance Measures, supra note 177 (follow “Onshore 
Significant Incident HCA” hyperlink) (noting that “[s]ince [high-consequence areas] are 
typically developed areas, [natural gas transmission] pipelines have increased integrity risks 
from excavation and outside force damage”). 
 345 See Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas, 65 
Fed. Reg. 21,695, 21,699 (proposed Apr. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 195) 
(describing “high consequence areas” as areas where “a pipeline failure could pose the 
greatest threat to public safety, the environment, and water commerce”). 
 346 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.901–.951 (natural gas transmission pipelines), .1001–.1015 
(natural gas distribution pipelines), 195.450, .452 (hazardous liquid pipelines) (2019). 
 347 RICK KOWALEWSKI, PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT: A REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 24–25 (Oct. 2013), http://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/10/Kowalewski-IM-PE_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W8J-3SDW]; NAT’L TRANSP. 
SAFETY BD., NTSB/SS-15/01, SAFETY STUDY: INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF GAS 
TRANSMISSION PIPELINES IN HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS 65 (Jan. 2015), https://www 
.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SS1501.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GH9-5LYE]. 
 348 KOWALEWSKI, supra note 347, at 25–27. 
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Second, the lack of a preventative approach to siting shifts the responsibility 
for preventing pipeline accidents from pipeline operators to landowners, nearby 
residents, and local governments. Rather than requiring operators to site 
pipelines away from people, the regulatory system relies heavily on the people 
exposed to risk to protect pipelines. This includes landowners who involuntarily 
encounter the risk because their property has been taken through eminent 
domain.349 PHMSA supports this shift by requiring pipeline operators to 
develop “public awareness” programs.350 The purpose of these programs is to 
educate residents about the hazards associated with pipelines and to enlist them 
as partners in safety so they will refrain from activities that damage the pipeline 
and monitor the right-of-way for any threats.351 The effectiveness of the 
operators’ programs is questionable.352 Local governments are also expected to 
manage the risks of existing pipelines through zoning and planning 
requirements. PHMSA recommends that local governments require developers 
to consult with pipeline operators and restrict land uses that could interfere with 
pipelines.353 The burden of reducing risk is thus on the community surrounding 
the pipeline. In practice, localities often do not curb incompatible land uses, 
because officials are not aware of the risk or because such restrictions are 
politically unpopular.354  
Third, the lack of a preventative approach puts extraordinary pressure on 
mitigation strategies to address the effects of accidents. PHMSA requires 
                                                                                                                     
 349 As other scholars have explored, pipeline companies generally have the authority to 
exercise eminent domain to site pipelines under either federal or state law. See Klass & 
Meinhardt, supra note 36, at 951.  
 350 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.616, 195.440 (2019). 
 351 AM. PETROLEUM INST., API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 1162: PUBLIC AWARENESS OF 
PROGRAMS FOR PIPELINE OPERATORS 3–4 (Dec. 2003), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/ 
ibr/002/api.1162.2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQX3-Q64P] (incorporated by reference in 49 
C.F.R. §§ 192.616, 195.440).  
 352 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ENBRIDGE REPORT, supra note 184, at 43 tbl.1 
(noting the results of a survey measuring the effectiveness of the public awareness program, 
in which only 23% of the affected public, 39% of public officials, and 47% of emergency 
officials said that they were “very well informed” about pipelines in their community); 
NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAN BRUNO REPORT, supra note 182, at 59 (noting the results 
of a survey measuring the effectiveness of the public awareness program, in which “the 
affected public was [the operator’s] least informed audience,” with 89% reporting that “they 
did not recall receiving information” from the operator and 34% reporting that they 
considered themselves “somewhat or very well informed”).  
 353 See, e.g., PIPA Audience: Local Government, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
SAFETY ADMIN., http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PIPA/pipa_audience_local_govern 
ment.htm [https://perma.cc/L2U3-79PK]. 
 354 See, e.g., COMM. FOR PIPELINES & PUB. SAFETY, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., TRANSMISSION PIPELINES AND LAND USE: A RISK-INFORMED APPROACH 36 
(2004), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr281.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF4L-J4CY] 
(“[A]necdotal evidence of building development, including schools, adjacent to transmission 
pipelines suggests that managing the risks to the public near pipelines has not been 
considered by many local governments.”). 
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pipeline operators to develop emergency plans with written procedures that 
detail how the operators will respond to an emergency.355 The operator must 
train its employees to follow the procedures.356 It must also establish a liaison 
with local emergency responders so that they can coordinate efforts when there 
is an incident.357 In addition, operators of oil pipelines must prepare a plan that 
identifies the resources that are available to clean up a “worst case discharge.”358 
In practice, operators have found it difficult to put the procedures into action 
and respond quickly to incidents.359 Overburdened fire departments and other 
emergency officials often do not understand the hazards of pipelines and how 
to respond to emergencies, either because the operator has failed to adequately 
train them or because the officials did not take the time to attend trainings.360 
And even if the system worked perfectly, there is a limit to mitigation as policy 
approach. Natural gas explosions, for example, will immediately destroy the 
buildings within the zone of impact.361  
Fourth, the lack of a preventative approach results in a greater number of 
pipelines than is economically efficient. When the operator is deemed a 
common carrier and there is no review of the need for the pipeline or alternative 
routes, the absence of a governance mechanism to consider long-term risks will 
lead to overbuilding. An efficient system of risk governance would require a 
pipeline operator to fully weigh the cost of the risk of a spill or release against 
the benefits in deciding whether to build a pipeline in a particular location.362 
Pipeline operators may have at least some incentive to site their pipelines in a 
way that minimizes their liability for future damages.363 But given the difficulty 
                                                                                                                     
 355 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.615, 195.402–.403. 
 356 Id. § 192.615(b)(2). 
 357 Id. §§ 192.615(c), 195.402(c)(12). 
 358 Id. §§ 194.101, .105. 
 359 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ENBRIDGE REPORT, supra note 184, at 8–18; NAT’L 
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAN BRUNO REPORT, supra note 182, at 98–99. 
 360 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ENBRIDGE REPORT, supra note 184, at 105; NAT’L 
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAN BRUNO REPORT, supra note 182, at 77 (noting that the fire chief 
of the city did not know there was a pipeline in that location). 
 361 See, e.g., NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/PAR-14/01, PIPELINE ACCIDENT 
REPORT: COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION PIPELINE RUPTURE, SISSONVILLE, 
WEST VIRGINIA 3 (Feb. 2014), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/ 
Reports/PAR1401.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKJ3-WC9T] (describing a natural gas 
transmission pipeline accident, which burned an area 820 feet wide and nearly 1100 feet long 
and destroyed three houses).  
 362 Cf. Russell S. Jutlah, Economic Theory and the Environment, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
1, 14 (2001) (stating that “the objective [of environmental economics] is to achieve a socially 
optimal allocation of resources by ensuring that polluters, and others whose activities may 
adversely affect environmental quality, bear the full costs that their activities may impose”). 
 363 Cf. Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 319, at 1737–38 (describing the “conventional 
retrospective liability approach,” in which “payment for all damages leads the injurer to 
internalize costs and to take appropriate levels of care”). 
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in predicting the consequences of an accident, it seems unlikely that liability 
results in full internalization of the cost of risk.364  
Even when the operator is required to obtain approval for a route from 
FERC or state governments, there will still be too many pipelines. This is 
because decision-makers do not consider the risks of an accident to be a part of 
economic regulation. For example, FERC frames the economic inquiry as 
whether existing customers will subsidize the pipeline project and the extent to 
which customers and property owners will bear additional financial costs.365 
The risk of long-term spills and releases should affect the economic calculus 
and thus the public need for the pipeline. FERC is already criticized for 
approving too many projects,366 but critics have not focused on the treatment of 
risk as a cause.367 
C. Three Potential Solutions 
To avoid these results, the siting and safety frameworks should adopt a more 
preventative approach to the risks of energy pipelines. This Article sketches 
three potential policy solutions: a policy that sets aside protected areas, a policy 
that returns decision-making to landowners and municipal governments, and a 
policy that combines safety and siting decisions. It concludes that the third 
solution provides the greatest benefits to communities and the environment. At 
the very least, this policy should apply to gas and hazardous liquid transmission 
pipelines as well as larger gas and oil gathering pipelines that effectively create 
the same risks as transmission lines. This would capture most of the projects 
that will be built in the next few decades, as well as the types of pipelines that 
are most likely to have a flexible route.  
                                                                                                                     
 364 Cf. id. at 1738 (arguing that it is difficult to determine the magnitude of harm when 
there is a catastrophic accident).  
 365 Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227, at 
19 (1999) (describing the initial assessment of adverse effects as “essentially an economic 
test” and explaining that “[o]nly when the benefits outweigh the adverse effects on economic 
interests will the Commission then proceed to complete the environmental analysis where 
other interests are considered”). 
 366 Since 1999, FERC has denied only two applications under Section 7 of the Natural 
Gas Act. SUSAN TIERNEY, ANALYSIS GRP., NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CERTIFICATION: POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A CHANGING INDUSTRY 12–13 (Nov. 2017), https://www.analysis 
group.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/ag_ferc_natural_gas_pipeline_certi
fication.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6T5-PCMY].  
 367 See, e.g., CATHY KUNKEL & TOM SANZILLO, INST. FOR ENERGY ECONS. & FIN. 
ANALYSIS, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EXPANSION IN APPALACHIA 1 
(Apr. 2016), http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Risks-Associated-With-Natural-
Gas-Pipeline-Expansion-in-Appalachia-_April-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2K6-93LM] 
(arguing that FERC’s allowed rate of return on equity and a lack of comprehensive planning 
encourage overbuilding, and concluding that so many new pipelines create a significant 
safety issue for landowners). 
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One policy solution is to follow the North Dakota model and create 
exclusion and avoidance areas. Under this policy, FERC and the states that 
choose to regulate siting would prohibit companies from siting pipelines in 
certain exclusion areas that are vulnerable to significant harm in an accident. 
Companies would also be required to avoid areas that were vulnerable to 
moderate harm unless there were no reasonable alternative. Because the policy 
would specifically focus on the risk of spills and releases, it would encompass 
pipelines sited outside of vulnerable areas if a worst-case release could impact 
the areas. This expansion would prevent companies from manipulating the 
system by building pipelines that skirt sensitive features yet still pose risks.  
Each jurisdiction could choose the areas it would protect. Alternatively, 
federal and state environmental, natural resource, and public health agencies 
could work together to establish risk-based criteria for designating vulnerable 
areas, taking into account the type of pipeline and the risks posed by different 
products. Each decision-maker would then apply the criteria to the areas within 
its jurisdiction. The policy could also draw on local knowledge by allowing local 
governments to nominate areas within their jurisdictions for consideration. If 
the governance process limits exclusions to locations where an accident would 
cause the most significant consequences, any exception to the prohibition should 
be narrow. For example, it could allow only those projects that have a 
demonstrated need to be in the area or that would pose greater risks to 
communities and the environment if they were required to use alternative routes. 
The benefits of this policy solution are that it would fit easily into the current 
regulatory frameworks, and it would take a completely preventative approach 
to risk by protecting sensitive areas from potential harm. This would reduce the 
number of accidents with significant consequences and free landowners and 
communities from the burdens of managing the risk and responding to 
accidents. But the policy would treat the safety of pipelines as a dichotomous 
choice between no harm and the risk of an accident. And the larger the protected 
area, the greater the pressure would be to make exceptions to the policy. Based 
on the North Dakota Public Service Commission’s implementation of the law, 
the decision-maker may find it challenging to protect areas when companies 
contend that it is necessary to site the pipeline in that location. This is 
particularly true because the decision-maker is likely to be hampered by 
information asymmetry; the pipeline company would have much more 
information about the need for the route and the characteristics of alternative 
routes than would the agency.  
Another solution would be to transfer the governance of siting to 
landowners and local governments. This policy would remove the power of 
condemnation from pipeline companies and give local governments the 
authority to regulate pipelines like any other land use under their zoning and 
planning laws. Federal and state agencies would retain jurisdiction over pipeline 
safety and public lands, but landowners and local governments would exert 
primary decision-making power over the pipeline route. The result would be a 
siting framework in which private landowners would decide the level of 
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acceptable risk, subject to local land use requirements. A version of this policy 
solution is already being implemented by Indian tribes, who have sovereign 
authority to decide whether to grant rights-of-way to pipeline companies and 
who may set conditions or restrictions on the approval.368  
The benefits of this policy solution are that it would internalize the social 
costs of a pipeline project by requiring companies to pay for the use of property 
and for the imposition of risk. Agreements could be structured to include yearly 
risk payments, which would more accurately reflect the cost of the pipeline 
operation.369 This would result in an efficient number of pipelines. But the 
effectiveness of the policy solution depends on whether individuals and local 
governments have enough information to make a decision on the acceptability 
of the risk. It is also possible that important pipeline projects that serve a public 
need would not be built because companies would be unable to obtain easements 
from holdouts.370 This is a potential problem, but it is not clear that it would be 
an insuperable hurdle for projects. Pipeline companies are currently siting 
projects in a few states without the power of eminent domain, presumably by 
paying more for the privilege.371  
This policy solution would not necessarily reduce the number of accidents 
or the burden of accidents on communities. Some individual property owners 
may choose not to allow pipelines in vulnerable areas or may be more likely to 
detect a problem because they appreciated the risk. In the absence of these 
private actions, it would be up to local governments to protect the community 
by adopting planning and zoning requirements. For example, local governments 
could adopt a minimum setback requirement for new pipelines and require that 
any developments in the area around the pipeline obtain prior approval from the 
zoning authority. But these actions would be dependent on the capacity of local 
                                                                                                                     
 368 See 25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a) (2019) (acknowledging that applicants for rights-of-way 
must obtain consent from tribes if the project is on tribal land). 
 369 In Wyoming, courts may award yearly payments to landowners for the taking of an 
easement under the state’s eminent domain statute. See Barlow Ranch, Ltd. P’ship v. 
Greencore Pipeline Co., 301 P.3d 75, 103 (Wyo. 2013); see also Kelianne Chamberlain, 
Unjust Compensation: Allowing a Revenue-Based Approach to Pipeline Takings, 14 WYO. 
L. REV. 77, 95–98 (2014) (arguing that landowners should receive annual payments tied to 
revenue as compensation). 
 370 See Coleman & Klass, supra note 38, at 717. 
 371 For example, in 2012, the Colorado Supreme Court held that companies may not 
exercise eminent domain authority to site oil pipelines in the state. Larson v. Sinclair Transp. 
Co., 284 P.3d 42, 46 (Colo. 2012) (en banc); see also Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 36, at 
987. Yet operators have built 1157 miles of oil pipeline in Colorado since 2012. Pipeline 
Mileage and Facilities, supra note 67. In Pennsylvania, companies have sited thousands of 
miles of gathering pipelines without eminent domain. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1104 (2000) 
(requiring a public utility to obtain a certificate of public convenience before exercising the 
power of eminent domain). But see Press Release, Penn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, PUC Continues 
Consideration of Laser Northeast Gathering Co. Application (May 19, 2011), http://www 
.puc.state.pa.us/about_puc/press_releases.aspx?ShowPR=2759 [https://perma.cc/MGD7-
6459] (describing 3-2 decision to grant a certificate to a gathering pipeline company).  
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governments to understand the risk and to make informed decisions that protect 
the public and environment.  
A final policy solution would be to combine the safety and siting 
frameworks into one risk governance system. Unlike the other solutions, this 
policy would grant a single agency the authority to review all of the risks of a 
pipeline project—from the risks of harm to the environment caused by 
construction, to the risks of operation, to the risks of an accident to individuals 
and property. The agency would then approve the pipeline if the location and 
the safety measures together made the risk acceptable. PHMSA would be the 
best agency to regulate the route and safety of gas and liquid interstate 
transmission pipelines because of its expertise on pipeline risk, while the states 
could regulate intrastate transmission lines.  
The primary benefit of this policy is that the agency would make more 
knowledgeable and comprehensive decisions about pipeline risk. In contrast to 
the current system and the other policy solutions, the decision-maker would be 
able to consider the entire life cycle of risk at the beginning of the project, from 
the location to the operation to the consequences of accidents. This 
comprehensive review would result in pipelines that have fewer accidents with 
less significant consequences, create less of a burden on communities and 
landowners to manage risk, and required fewer emergency response measures. 
The policy would also improve economic efficiency by ensuring that only those 
pipelines that create an acceptable risk would be built.  
One potential criticism is that the comprehensiveness of the review may 
delay the approval of worthy projects. FERC addresses this issue by offering the 
option of pre-filing procedures.372 PHMSA and the states could also look to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulation of nuclear power plants 
as a model.373 The NRC regulates all risks associated with the plants, from 
siting, to design, to operation, to the final stage of decommissioning.374 To 
streamline the process, however, the NRC allows operators to apply for an early 
site permit. The commission weighs safety issues related to the location, effects 
on the environment, and emergency planning in the permitting decision.375 The 
risks posed solely by the design and operation of the plant are then evaluated in 
separate proceedings.376  
This solution would no doubt face political hurdles. The states would likely 
oppose any attempt to give jurisdiction over the siting of interstate oil and 
hydrocarbon liquid pipelines to the federal government, even if the states were 
given more authority over the risks of siting intrastate pipelines in return. FERC 
may not be any more amenable to relinquishing its authority over the siting of 
natural gas pipelines, though it could retain economic regulation of the lines. 
But the second option would transfer even more authority from state and federal 
                                                                                                                     
 372 18 CFR § 157.21 (2018). 
 373 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296b (2016). 
 374 Id. §§ 2133, 2137. 
 375 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.12–.39 (2019). 
 376 Id. §§ 52.41–.63 (design certification), .71–.110 (combined licenses). 
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agencies to local governments and individuals. And setting aside their parochial 
interests, all of the government agencies must recognize that the current system 
is not successful.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States is in the midst of a radical reshaping of energy pipeline 
networks that will create a new landscape of risk for decades to come. The recent 
controversies surrounding pipelines demonstrate that the public is deeply 
skeptical of risk decisions made by government agencies and pipeline 
companies. Yet the legal frameworks governing the siting and safety of these 
pipelines fail to use the one tool that would prevent the worst harms to 
communities and the environment—preventative land-use planning. This failure 
is based on a shuttered vision of pipelines as self-contained systems that can be 
placed in almost any location with the right safety devices. It is time for risk 
governance to expand its remit, thus matching the geographic scope and 
optimism of the domestic energy revolution.  
